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THE AGENCY COSTS OF TEAMWORK
Jeremy McClane†
Transactional lawyers working in corporate finance com-
monly assume that good teamwork results in better deals.
While this may be true, teamwork can also magnify agency
costs between issuing companies and the lawyers that serve
them.  This occurs for at least two reasons.  First, teamwork,
as it is frequently executed, can discourage dissent by team
members even though well-handled disagreement is neces-
sary for optimal outcomes.  Second, since all members of the
deal team ostensibly serve the issuing company, team cohe-
sion can mask the subtle but significant ways in which the
interests of the lawyers and the underwriters diverge from
those of the issuers.  Whether teamwork’s benefits generally
outweigh its costs in capital markets deals is a question with
no obvious a priori answer.
This Article presents a theoretical and empirical analysis
of agency costs in team dealmaking, using initial public offer-
ing (“IPO”) transactions as a case study.  The Article finds
support for concluding that the tension between a lawyer’s
dual role as agent and team member carries little-noticed but
significant costs that often offset some of the benefits that
come from familiarity between parties in a deal.  Drawing on
interviews with practitioners and analyzing a unique dataset
of 2,265 initial public offering deals, I investigate the potential
negative impact of team dynamics in capital markets deals by
looking at collaboration between lawyers on both sides of
each deal and the investment banks that frequently take com-
panies public.  The analysis reveals that while familiarity be-
tween the lawyers and bankers in a deal may promote
teamwork and lead to faster deal completion times, it is also
associated with systematically negative consequences for the
issuing companies, such as higher levels of underpricing and
a greater likelihood of securities litigation.  I analyze the impli-
cations of these findings for the law of fiduciary duty, the rules
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governing lawyers’ ethics, and the norms by which securities
deals are executed.
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INTRODUCTION
The lawyer is the archetypal agent.1  But to stop at agency
would tell only half the story.  In many transactional situa-
1 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013)
(describing the lawyer’s duties: “A lawyer, as a member of the legal profession, is a
representative of clients”).  Where the lawyer’s duties conflict, the lawyer has an
“obligation zealously to protect and pursue a client’s legitimate interests, within
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tions, such as when companies first issue securities into the
capital markets,2 the lawyer-as-agent becomes the lawyer-as-
team-member, collaborating with all the parties involved in the
deal: the investment bank underwriters, the issuing company’s
management, and the lawyers on the other side.  The ostensi-
ble goal of this collaboration is to get the best deal for the
issuing company, which is the ultimate client of the lawyers
and bankers alike.  In this context, teamwork overshadows the
lawyer’s traditional advocacy role as parties on all sides of the
table pursue a common goal.3
Transactional lawyers understand the importance of team-
work and few would dispute that it facilitates deal making.4
More surprising perhaps is that even when it is well executed,
teamwork can undermine the very deals its members work to-
gether to complete.  This is so because teamwork can both
exacerbate and conceal conflicts between the interests of
agents (the lawyers and investment bankers) and their clients
(the issuing companies).5  While teamwork may improve effi-
the bounds of the law . . . .” Id.; see also Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin,
Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litiga-
tion, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 550 (1994) (surveying the standards governing legal
practice and concluding that “[t]raditional norms of professional conduct are in-
sistently client-centered”).
2 For the sake of simplicity, I use the general terms “capital markets” and
“capital markets deals” to refer to transactions that result in a company’s issu-
ance of debt or equity securities.
3 By “teamwork,” I mean a group production process in which the work of all
members of the group is essential to completing the goal. See Armen A. Alchian &
Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62
AM. ECON. REV. 777, 777–80 (1972) (defining team production as “production in
which 1) several types of resources are used and 2) the product is not a sum of
separable outputs of each cooperating resource . . . [and] 3) not all resources used
in team production belong to one person”).
4 For instance, it is common for law firms to promote their reputations for
teamwork in recruiting and marketing materials. See, e.g., Emerging Companies,
COOLEY LLP, http://www.cooley.com/emergingcompanies (last visited Apr. 6,
2016) [http://perma.cc/X69E-ACM6] (“Clients who partner with us get the ad-
vantage of extensive experience, true teamwork and an entrepreneurial cul-
ture . . . .”); Mergers and Acquisitions, SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, http://www
.sullcrom.com/Mergers—Acquisitions-Practices (last visited Apr. 6, 2016) [http:/
/perma.cc/LLX5-4YS6] (“Teamwork is a hallmark of S&C.  Lawyers from multiple
disciplines and offices within the Firm work with each other and with the client,
as well as with investment bankers, accountants, proxy solicitors and other advis-
ers.  This close collaboration with clients and colleagues gives the M&A team great
versatility.  The Group can execute any type of transaction, in any industry,
economic climate or geographic region.”).
5 See generally Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, An Analysis of the
Principal-Agent Problem, 51 ECONOMETRICA 7, 10–18 (1983) (explaining the princi-
pal-agency problem and advancing an approach to it).  For a review of the sources
of agency costs both generally and among lawyers, see George M. Cohen, When
Law and Economics Met Professional Responsibility, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 273, 279
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-5\CRN501.txt unknown Seq: 5 30-JUN-16 15:55
2016] THE AGENCY COSTS OF TEAMWORK 1233
ciency and yield better results in a transaction, the group’s
pursuit of a common goal can blur the boundaries of a lawyer’s
agency role and create confusion as to whether the lawyers
should pay deference to the issuer or the underwriter—a con-
fusion that is intensified when the lawyers have an incentive to
ingratiate themselves with the investment banks who are re-
peat players in the IPO market.  At the same time, teamwork
can make such conflicts difficult to deal with because parties
either fail to recognize them or refrain from raising objections
for fear of damaging the collaborative ethos.  Over time, team
members’ desire for cohesion and aversion to disagreement
may also lead to groupthink, thus making it more difficult for
lawyers to perceive how their clients’ interests diverge from the
goals that the group is pursuing.  In short, teamwork may par-
adoxically be both the key to a successful deal and a threat to
the lawyer’s effectiveness as an advocate.
This Article provides theory and evidence of the conflict
between agency and teamwork in capital markets deals, which
comprise a large proportion of the work done by transactional
lawyers.6  The analysis builds on earlier research on familiarity
between repeat players in IPOs, expanding it to the question of
whether teamwork has any measurable benefits or drawbacks
in the context of capital markets transactions, the collaborative
character of which differs from the more adversarial litigation
or M&A realms.  To explore that question, I draw on interviews
with practitioners as well as statistical analysis of a unique
dataset collected from 2,265 initial public offerings of company
stock (“IPOs”) conducted between 1996 and 2010.  The dataset
catalogues information on the banks, law firms, and the indi-
vidual lawyers involved in the deals, as well as stock perform-
ance data, company financial data, disclosure from each
prospectus, and litigation statistics, among other items.
(1998) (“In all principal-agent relationships, there is a divergence of interests . . . .
Because the agent does not reap the full reward from his efforts on the principal’s
behalf, and because the agent knows more than the principal about what the
agent is doing (what economists refer to as ‘asymmetric information’), the agent
has the incentive and opportunity to act—whether alone or in concert with
others—in numerous ways that harm the principal’s interests.”). See also ROBERT
H. MNOOKIN, SCOTT R. PEPPET & ANDREW S. TULUMELLO, BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING
TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 252 (2000) [hereinafter BEYOND WINNING]
(discussing sources of agency costs in negotiations).
6 See, e.g., Dealogic - ECM Statshot, DEALOGIC http://www.dealogic.com/
media/market-insights/ecm-statshot/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2016) [http://perma
.cc/RDW6-PSMB] (depicting a table of equity capital markets volume by world
region).
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As the analysis below demonstrates, evidence of significant
agency costs between issuing companies and their legal coun-
sel is especially pronounced just when the conditions for team
cohesion are at their best.  Although collaboration and team-
work cannot be directly observed ex post in the data, a reasona-
ble proxy is the repeated interaction between the parties
involved in the deal: the investment bank underwriters, the
issuing company’s management, and the lawyers for each side.
I analyze the interactions between the law firms and underwrit-
ers at the organizational level and then, using names of counsel
drawn from SEC filings, I analyze the repeated interactions at
the level of individual lawyers.  The analysis reveals two broad
conclusions: (1) that repeated interaction between lawyers and
the investment banks is linked to some benefits one would
expect to find with better teamwork from repeated collabora-
tion on the same kind of task; and (2) that repeated interaction
is also linked to evidence of significant agency costs between
the issuer, its counsel, and its underwriters.
And even though their role is rarely recognized, such
agency costs contribute regularly to problems that make head-
lines in the financial press.  An illustration is the decade-long
litigation over the 1999 IPO of the online toy retailer eToys.7  A
few years after going public, eToys sued its lead underwriter,
Goldman Sachs, alleging that the investment bank had inten-
tionally underpriced the deal by selling eToys’ stock cheaply to
Goldman’s favored clients while leaving eToys with too little
capital to survive.8
While many observers of the case focused on the role that
the investment bankers played in eToys’ poor outcome, few
mentioned the part played by the lawyers charged with safe-
guarding eToys’ interests.  The lawyers may have played a
larger role than many assumed.  When eToys launched its IPO
in May 1999, it was the second IPO deal in two years that
Goldman Sachs had led with the equity capital markets team of
its counsel, the law firm of Gunderson, Dettmer, Stough, Vil-
leneuve, Franklin & Hachigian, LLP.9  By contrast, the firm
representing eToys—the Venture Law Group (“VLG”)—had
7 See Tom Hals, Goldman Sachs Finally Ends Litigation Over 1999 eToys IPO,
REUTERS (Sept. 19, 2013, 2:07 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/
19/us-goldmansachs-etoys-settlement-idUSBRE98I0VL20130919 [http://perma
.cc/A9BW-F8FQ].
8 See EBC I, Inc. v. Goldman Sachs & Co., No. 601805/2002 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2003).
9 This information comes from the data collected by the author. See IPO
Dataset (on file with author).
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worked with Goldman on five IPOs in the preceding year, each
time as Goldman’s own counsel.10  In fact, at the time of the
eToys IPO, VLG was simultaneously representing Goldman in
connection with a different company’s IPO.  Meanwhile, both
sets of counsel had faced each other in four other IPOs during
the preceding year.11
The familiarity amongst the lawyers and bankers in the
eToys IPO was not unusual, and likely caused the deal to run
more smoothly.  At the same time, one could worry that the
routinized processes and sense of affiliation from repeated in-
teraction that make teamwork successful might have under-
mined VLG’s ability to recognize and defend eToys’ best
interests.  That worry would be especially high if the lawyers
were also concerned (consciously or not) about maintaining the
ability to collaborate with the underwriter or opposing law firm,
whom they expect to meet in future deals.
Agency costs in the context of transactional teamwork have
received little attention in the legal literature;12 nor have they
10 See id.
11 See id.
12 Scholarship in the past several decades has advanced the idea that cooper-
ation among lawyers would be beneficial to both clients and society as a whole,
and research has focused on finding ways to foster it among legal professionals.
See, e.g., Rachel Croson & Robert H. Mnookin, Does Disputing Through Agents
Enhance Cooperation? Experimental Evidence, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 331, 335–40
(1997) (examining experimentally the impact of lawyer reputational concerns in
improving cooperation); Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Specu-
lations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97–104 (1974);
Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 1, at 550 (considering three levels of institutional R
reform proposals to help facilitate cooperation between lawyers and their clients);
Robert H. Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail: An Exploration of Barriers to the Reso-
lution of Conflict, 8 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 235, 248–49 (1993) (exploring
improved collaboration in overcoming negotiation barriers).  Galanter describes
repeat litigants (engaged in multiple similar litigations over a certain time period)
with systemic goals as distinguished from one-time litigants with more self-re-
garding goals. See generally Galanter, supra note 12.  Gallanter argues that R
repeat players have a structural advantage due to better “information, [the] ability
to surmount cost barriers, and [the] skill to navigate restrictive procedural re-
quirements.” Id. at 119.
The type of cooperation that these studies deal with is distinct from team-
work, as it is described in this Article.  Cooperation, as used in other research,
refers to the lawyers on opposite sides of litigation revealing information and
working to come to a swift resolution for their clients. See, e.g., Gilson &
Mnookin, supra note 1, at 550 (referring to the relationship between lawyers as R
“critical”).  Teamwork includes cooperation but goes beyond it, encompassing the
working relationships between all parties, including the lawyers, clients, and
other outside experts, largely subsuming adversarialism in pursuit of a common
goal.  One article that obliquely discusses teamwork is Manuel A. Utset, Producing
Information: Initial Public Offerings, Production Costs, and the Producing Lawyer,
74 OR. L. REV. 275 (1995).  The essay outlines a production theory of IPO transac-
tions, comparing lawyers to a machine serving to reduce production costs.  In
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been widely addressed in the realm of financial economics.13
In this Article, I examine teamwork’s potential agency problems
by exploiting quasi-random variation in the identities of the
lead underwriters and the counsel representing issuers.  I start
from the observation that lawyers and investment bankers who
perform equity capital markets deals frequently come across
the same players in a given industry, geographic region, and
time period.  While the pool of repeat players is relatively small,
it is nonetheless large enough to accommodate a great deal of
variation among the sets of lawyers and bankers on any partic-
ular transaction.  Underwriting banks and issuing companies
typically do not pick each other’s lawyers in IPOs, and once
industry, geography, time period, and the influence of venture
capital are controlled for, the variation in the makeup of deal
teams can be treated as though random with respect to the
deal-related outcomes of interest.14  I use this method to com-
pare transactions in which the parties have worked frequently
together in a deal team in a short timespan (an important in-
gredient and determinant of teamwork15) and transactions in
which parties are less familiar with each other.16  Specifically, I
examine repeated interactions between: the underwriter’s
counsel and the underwriter; the issuer’s counsel and the un-
derwriter (the party on the other side of the table); the issuer’s
counsel and the underwriter when issuer’s counsel has re-
doing so, the essay describes lawyers as part of a deal team, although it does not
undertake an empirical study or make theoretical predictions.  Another fascinat-
ing set of findings outside of the finance setting, but consistent with the research
herein, can be found in Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, Incentive Contracts
for Teams: Experimental Evidence, 119 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 496, 496–511
(2015).
13 See generally 1 HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE FINANCE: EMPIRICAL CORPORATE FI-
NANCE 270–81 (B. Espen Eckbo ed., 2007) [hereinafter HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE
FINANCE] (reviewing the voluminous empirical finance literature on capital
markets).
14 I note that in IPOs of companies that have venture capital backing, the
venture capital investors may have an influence over the choice of law firms.
However, the results of the analysis are the same for both VC-backed and non-
VC-backed deals.  The results similarly survive adding controls for the presence of
VC backing, indicating that this factor in counsel selection is not important to the
result. See infra Part III.B.
15 See Steve W.J. Kozlowski & Daniel R. Ilgen, Enhancing the Effectiveness of
Work Groups and Teams, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 77, 81 (2006). (“[R]epeated
interactions among individuals that constitute processes tend to regularize, such
that shared structures . . . crystallize and then serve to guide subsequent process
interactions.  Process begets structure, which in turn guides process.”).
16 I recognize that, at first blush, this description of the empirical approach
raises obvious concerns about selection.  I address selection using a number of
strategies designed to rule it out. See infra Part III.B.2.
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cently served as the underwriter’s counsel in an IPO; and is-
suer’s counsel and underwriter’s counsel.
The results are striking for their contrasts.  For example,
an important pattern emerges with respect to the opening day
price performance of an issuing company’s stock revealing pos-
itive and negative implications.  Opening day price perform-
ance, often referred to as the “bounce,” is considered to be
essential to a successful deal, and underwriters often under-
price a deal by 15% of what they believe the fully distributed
trading value will be to encourage a bounce.17  However, an
excessively high bounce is detrimental to the issuing company,
because it means the company sold the stock at too low a price
(i.e., underpriced) and could have captured more of the value
out of the deal.18  When the underwriter’s counsel has repre-
sented an underwriter repeatedly within the past year, the
first-day bounce of the security they create increases by 3–5%
on average for each interaction, when controlling for other fac-
tors that might have an impact on first-day performance.  This
can be interpreted as a relatively modest indication of good deal
performance because it indicates stronger demand in the
issuance.
However, where the issuer’s counsel and underwriter have
been on the same deal team frequently in the past year (as was
17 Underwriters frequently attempt to attain a first-day bounce by intention-
ally underpricing the IPO stock, typically by 10–15% of the stock’s expected equi-
librium trading price. See Sean J. Griffith, Spinning and Underpricing: A Legal
and Economic Analysis of the Preferential Allocation of Shares in Initial Public
Offerings, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 583, 589, 650 (2004).  The purpose of underpricing is
reported to be ensuring strong demand and attracting publicity to the stock. See
id. at 602–03.  For example, sealed documents from the eToys litigation made
public in early 2013 feature a Goldman Sachs pitchbook stating that an IPO
should be priced at a “10–15% discount to the expected fully distributed trading
level . . . [which is its] anticipated ‘seasoned’ trading value 1–3 months after the
offering.”  Joe Nocera, eToys vs. Goldman Sachs: The Documents, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/03/10/opinion/sunday/
nocera-goldman-sachs-etoys.html [http://perma.cc/F5CR-QDBC] (publishing
sealed documents from EBC I, Inc., v. Goldman Sachs & Co., No. 601805/2002
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003)).
18 See Griffith, supra note 17, at 600.  Underpricing benefits underwriters by R
allowing them to offer extremely high returns to favored investors while losing out
on very little by way of commissions. See id. at 593–94 (“[U]nderwriters may be
able to increase profits above their base compensation by engaging in underpric-
ing.  This may seem contradictory since, as noted above, underwriter compensa-
tion is a percentage of aggregate offering proceeds, which are maximized by
raising, not lowering, the offering price.  However, underpricing creates an addi-
tional profit opportunity for underwriters by enabling the practice of spinning.”);
see also Tim Loughran & Jay Ritter, Why Has IPO Underpricing Changed Over
Time?, 33 FIN. MGMT. 5, 8 (2004) (noting that levels of underpricing above several
percent implies that underwriters are not acting in the interests of issuers).
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the situation in the eToys IPO) the price increase is much
higher: the bounce increases by 9% on average for each past
interaction, controlling for other factors.  When the issuer’s
counsel has represented the underwriter in an IPO in the past
year, the bounce is 12–16% higher than average, again holding
other factors constant.19  Although a moderate level of price
jump is to be expected in an IPO, the higher average first-day
jump when the issuer’s counsel has worked repeatedly with the
underwriter is troubling, because it suggests a relationship be-
tween the issuer losing money in the deal and the issuer’s
counsel having a more familiar relationship with the under-
writer.  The underwriter, for its part, is less troubled by money
left on the table.  In the eToys case, for example, documents
were produced in court that demonstrated how the money left
on the table was captured by the underwriter’s clients, which
in turn generated future business and favorable relationships,
all at the issuer’s expense.20  In addition to money left on the
table, a troubling pattern emerges when litigation outcomes are
analyzed: when the issuer’s counsel has represented the un-
derwriter in the preceding year, the associated probability that
19 See Appendix Table 1.  Note that the results described in this paragraph
are for repeated interactions among firms.  When repeated interactions between
individual lawyers are analyzed, the results remain significant and become larger
in magnitude for all four varieties of interaction studied.  This indicates that the
observed effect is driven by the interactions between the individuals involved.
20 By way of illustration, one commentator on the eToys IPO observed that:
eToys opened at $78 per share, which meant that Goldman’s clients
were sitting on a profit of $475 million the minute that the stock
started trading on the open market.  In most cases, the clients
cashed out—which was smart, because eToys didn’t stay at those
levels for long.  But if Goldman got back 40% of those profits in
trading commissions, then it made $190 million in commissions
[from clients], compared to that $11.5 million in fees [from doing the
IPO].
If Goldman had raised the IPO price to $37 per share, then yes
its fee income would have gone up by $10 million, to $21.5 million.
But—assuming the stock would still have opened at $78—its cli-
ents’ opening-tick profits would have come down to $336 million,
and Goldman’s 40% share of that would also have come down, to
$135 million.  Total income to Goldman?  $156.5 million, rather
than $201.5 million.  If the IPO price were higher, Goldman’s total
take would have gone down by about $45 million . . . .
If you look at the chart of what happened to the eToys share
price in the first few months after the IPO, the price fluctuated
around $40 a share—which means that by Goldman’s own stan-
dards, it really ought to have priced the IPO much closer to $37 than
to $20.
Felix Salmon, Where Banks Really Make Money on IPOs, REUTERS BLOGS (Mar. 11,
2013), http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2013/03/11/where-banks-really-
make-money-on-ipos/ [http://perma.cc/PHH4-L44V].
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the issuing company will be subject to a securities class action
lawsuit nearly doubles.21
These results, along with those described in more detail in
this Article, provide evidence that while teamwork enhances a
deal, the familiarity and collaboration that go hand-in-hand
with teamwork have the potential to enhance the costs of
agents’ misaligned incentives.  Put simply, frequent interaction
is a core component of teamwork, and groups who work to-
gether form better teams.22  However, teamwork in a context
where adversarial interests exist23 may pose dangers with re-
spect to the lawyer’s fundamental duties as an agent.
The rest of this Article is organized as follows.  Part I pro-
vides an overview of the IPO process and the role of the issuer,
the investment banks, and the lawyers for each side.  Part II
explains the empirical strategy and develops the hypotheses to
be tested.  Part III discusses the quantitative results, their in-
terpretation, and competing possible interpretations.  Part IV
provides a discussion of the legal and practical implications of
the results.
I
BACKGROUND: COLLABORATION IN THE IPO PROCESS
This section provides an overview of the process by which
IPO deals typically occur.  Generally speaking, the team doing
an IPO works to complete a common set of tasks: gathering
information about the issuing company, creating an offering
document, marketing the issuing company to investors, li-
aising with the Securities Exchange Commission, and stock
exchanges to ensure that regulatory requirements are met.24
Although all the members of the deal team take part in all of
these tasks, they also take on specialized roles that are impor-
21 See Appendix Table 4.  All specifications include controls for industries,
years, and other confounds.  The majority of the results are significant at the 5%,
1%, or 0.1% level using robust standard errors, with a few results significant at
the 10% level using robust standard errors.
22 See J. Richard Hackman, Why Teams Don’t Work, in 4 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGI-
CAL APPLICATIONS TO SOCIAL ISSUES: THEORY AND RESEARCH ON SMALL GROUPS, 245,
249–50 (R. Scott Tindale et al. eds., 2002).
23 See EBC I, Inc. v. Goldman Sachs & Co., No. 601805/2002 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2003) (describing the interests of the underwriter and issuer in a firm commit-
ment underwriting as “adversarial” in nature and rejecting the assertion that the
underwriter had a fiduciary duty to the issuer with respect to the IPO price
negotiation).
24 See generally Carl W. Schneider, Joseph M. Manko & Robert S. Kant,
Going Public: Practice, Procedure, and Consequences, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1981)
(describing the tasks performed by bankers, lawyers, and issuing company man-
agement when doing an IPO).
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tant to understand for analyzing the team dynamic and the
emergence of agency costs.
A. The Role of Issuers and Underwriters
An IPO begins when a privately held company decides to
issue publicly traded equity.25  A company’s decision to “go
public” frequently turns on the need to raise capital in order to
fund its operations and grow.26  The issuing company selects
an investment bank to act as the managing underwriter to
shepherd the transaction to completion.27  The investment
banks that do IPOs often complete dozens of such transactions
a year, and thus have process expertise in documenting the
deals, liaising with the SEC, coordinating the various parties,
and working out the financial aspects of the offering.28  In addi-
tion, they take the lead in marketing the deal to the initial
investors, most of whom are institutional investors such as
mutual funds, pension funds, and hedge funds with whom the
underwriter has relationships.29
Issuers choose underwriters using one of two general
methods: the issuer can auction the position to the most com-
petitive bidder among a group of banks in a process known as
competitive underwriting, or the issuer can choose an under-
writer based on informal negotiations in what is known as ne-
gotiated underwriting.30  Competitive underwriting seldom
occurs in the U.S. market except in certain circumstances for
which it is legally mandated.31  For negotiated underwritings,
25 See Griffith, supra note 17, at 585 (“An initial public offering of equity, or R
‘IPO,’ is a company’s first sale of shares into the public market.”).
26 There are other reasons a company might go public in addition to the need
for capital.  For example, a company may need to create a liquid market for its
stock to use it as a type of employee compensation.
27 Occasionally two managing underwriters will be appointed, often referred
to as joint lead managers or joint bookrunners. See Royce de R. Barondes et al.,
Underwriters’ Counsel as Gatekeeper or Turnstile: An Empirical Analysis of Law
Firm Prestige and Performance in IPOs, 2 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 164, 166 (2007) (describ-
ing the process of selecting the underwriter).  This happens when the IPO is
expected to be particularly large.  There are 826 observations involving joint man-
agers in the dataset, comprising 30.3% of the deals.  As explained below, these
observations were weighted to avoid a double-counting effect.
28 See id.
29 See id. at 168.
30 JOHN C. BURCH, JR. & BRUCE S. FOERSTER, CAPITAL MARKETS HANDBOOK 272
(6th ed. 2016) [hereinafter CAPITAL MARKETS HANDBOOK].
31 For instance, underwriters for municipal securities are usually chosen by
auction.  The reason for issuers’ overwhelming preference for negotiated under-
writing has puzzled commentators. See Yoram Barzel, Michel A. Habib & D.
Bruce Johnsen, IPO Syndicates, Private Foreknowledge, and the Economics of
Excess Search 7 (2000) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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the issuer chooses the lead manager from a number of eligible
banks after a series of meetings, colloquially known as “beauty
contests” or “bake sales,” where each underwriter will show-
case their experience and provide an early estimate of the price
at which it will market the issuer’s stock.32  Negotiated under-
writings in the U.S. market overwhelmingly involve so-called
firm commitment contracts—contracts that require the under-
writer first to purchase all of the issuer’s shares itself,33 then
resell the shares to investors in the market.34  The effect of this
is that the underwriter is liable for any shares that cannot be
sold in the market.35  As compensation, the underwriter takes
a percentage of the total proceeds of the deal.  In U.S. deals
completed in recent years, most IPOs have had a gross spread
of 7% of the total amount raised.36
For most deals, underwriters form syndicates with a num-
ber of other banks to help distribute the shares and spread the
sales effort, costs, and risk.37  A common syndicate includes
ten to twenty banks, although syndicates of over one hundred
banks are not unheard of.38  Regardless of the syndicate size,
the first underwriter chosen by the issuer becomes the “lead” or
“managing” underwriter and retains control of almost every
aspect of the IPO process.39  The other syndicate members are
32 See Barondes et al., supra note 27, at 166 (describing the process of select- R
ing the underwriter).  The choice of lead underwriter may also be influenced by
preexisting relationships with an underwriting firm.  See CAPITAL MARKETS HAND-
BOOK, supra note 30, at 272. R
33 See Griffith, supra note 17, at 590.  Two other types of contracts sometimes R
found in U.S. underwritings are best efforts contracts and standby contracts. See
In re Nat’l Ass’n of Secs. Dealers, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 17,371, 21 SEC
Docket 930 (Dec. 12, 1980).  Since these contracts are rarely used, this Article
does not focus on them.
34 See In re Nat’l Ass’n of Secs. Dealers, Inc. at *3 (describing firm commit-
ment underwriting).
35 In practice, this is rarely a problem, and most IPOs are oversubscribed.
See Griffith, supra note 17, at 590. R
36 See id. at 592; see also Hsuan-Chi Chen & Jay R. Ritter, The Seven Percent
Solution, 55 J. FIN. 1105, 1107–12 (2000) (describing the 7% underwriting dis-
count that persists in most IPOs, particularly those in the $30–120 million range,
and arguing that its persistence is a result of implicit collusion, or strategic
pricing, amongst underwriters).
37 See Yoram Barzel, Michel A. Habib & D. Bruce Johnsen, Prevention Is
Better Than Cure: The Role of IPO Syndicates in Precluding Information Acquisition,
79 J. BUS. 2911, 2911–23 (2006).  A number of theories have been advanced to
explain the use of underwriting syndicates.  One theory suggests that it is done to
remove the threat of speculation and opportunism by other banks. See id.
38 See Barzel, Habib & Johnsen, supra note 31, at 2929 (describing the trend R
toward larger syndicates).
39 It is not unusual for large IPOs to have multiple lead underwriters as well.
In this case, one of the lead underwriters typically maintains control of the trans-
action, selects counsel, and manages the deal.  This underwriter is known as the
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relatively passive apart from their role helping to place their
allocation of shares.40
Once selected, the lead underwriter appoints counsel to
advise it and the rest of the syndicate.41  Due diligence com-
mences shortly thereafter and the issuer, the bankers, and
both sets of counsel begin drafting the offering prospectus—the
document that serves as the primary marketing document for
the IPO.42  This preliminary prospectus (referred to as the red
herring) is filed with the SEC on Form S-1.43  Although the
price of the stock is not set when the preliminary prospectus is
filed, SEC regulations require that it contain a bona fide price
estimate, usually given as a range.44
When the prospectus is filed and while the SEC review is
taking place, the lead underwriter and issuer management
commence a marketing effort, the “road show,” during which
they will meet with investors in different cities and build a book
of indicative orders for the stock based on the information in
the preliminary prospectus.45  The investors to whom the IPO is
marketed are typically large institutional investors.  Upon com-
pletion of the roadshow, the lead underwriter and the issuing
company’s management agree on a final price for the stock,
largely influenced by the level of investor demand revealed on
“lead left” underwriter due to the fact that its name appears on the leftmost side of
the prospectus cover. See Telephone Interview with Attorney (D) (name withheld
by request) (July 23, 2013) (on file with author) [hereinafter Interview with D].  For
this study, I analyzed the data using the lead left as the underwriter, and using a
method to de-weight observations with multiple underwriters.
40 See Shane A. Corwin & Paul Schultz, The Role of IPO Underwriting Syndi-
cates: Pricing, Information Production, and Underwriter Competition, 60 J. FIN. 443,
446 (2005) (“These [non-managing syndicate members] do less work than co-
managers, but are also relatively cheap to include.”).
41 See CAPITAL MARKETS HANDBOOK, supra note 30, at 232. R
42 See Barondes et al., supra note 27, at 166–67 (describing the preliminary R
stages of the IPO process).
43 See id.; see also JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES REGULA-
TION: CASES AND MATERIALS 100–01, 115 (11th ed. 2012) (describing the process of
drafting the “red herring,” or preliminary prospectus).  The preliminary prospec-
tus can be filed on other forms as well: companies under a certain size can file on
Form SB-1, and certain types of companies can file on Form S-3.  17 C.F.R.
§§ 228.501, 229.501 (2016).  These are collectively called “S-1” in this Article for
ease of reference.
44 17 C.F.R. §§ 228.501, 229.501. See also Barondes et al., supra note 27, at R
166–67.
45 Investors cannot yet make binding orders, but can indicate how much
stock they would purchase, and they typically abide by their indications. See
Securities Act of 1933 § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (2012); see also COFFEE & SALE,
supra note 43, at 115 (“Sales are . . . still barred . . . and the underwriter also R
cannot accept customers’ oral offers to buy.  But the underwriters can ‘build their
book,’ collecting non-binding indications of interest from customers, which they
hope to convert into sales once the registration statement is declared effective.”).
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the roadshow, as well as market conditions.46  Setting the final
price is technically a negotiation; however, issuers tend to rely
heavily on their underwriters’ advice in this process.47  When
the final price is agreed upon and the prospectus is approved,
final pricing information will be filed and a final prospectus and
registration statement will be deemed effective by the SEC.48
Once the registration statement becomes effective, the shares
are sold to investors at the final price, thus entering the
market.49
B. Issuer’s Counsel and Underwriter’s Counsel
When a company decides to issue stock to the public, its
management retains counsel to assist in the process if the
company does not already have legal counsel.  The issuer’s
counsel will be part of the transaction from the very begin-
ning.50  In many cases, it will assist the issuer after the deal is
concluded in its ongoing reporting obligations under the Secur-
ities Exchange Act of 1934.51  Underwriter’s counsel is in turn
retained once the underwriter is selected and the syndicate is
formed.52  Although underwriter’s counsel represents the en-
tire syndicate, the lawyers take their instructions almost exclu-
sively from the lead underwriter.53
The issuing company’s choice of counsel is important, be-
cause the issuer’s counsel typically takes a leading role in coor-
dinating the parties to the deal, conducting the due diligence,
drafting the prospectus, and resolving legal uncertainties in
connection with the issuance.54  Perhaps most importantly, the
issuer’s lawyers serve as guide and advisor to the issuing com-
46 See Barondes et al., supra note 27, at 168 (“In a customary IPO, there is R
not a definitive agreement on the price at which the underwriters will resell the
stock to the public until after the preliminary marketing process is complete . . . .
SEC rules, however, require that a preliminary prospectus for an IPO circulated
prior to the pricing include a bona fide estimate of the price, frequently stated as a
range, at which the stock will be sold.  This price estimate may change in subse-
quent preliminary prospectuses, as the managing underwriter acquires informa-
tion during the marketing process.” (footnote omitted)).
47 See id.
48 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.424(b), 230.430A (2016); see also COFFEE & SALE,
supra note 43, at 129. R
49 See COFFEE & SALE, supra note 43, at 129. R
50 See id.
51 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2012); see also
CAPITAL MARKETS HANDBOOK, supra note 30, at 274. R
52 See Interview with D, supra note 39. R
53 See id.
54 See Schneider et al., supra note 24, at 17–19 (discussing the role played by R
the issuing company’s counsel when beginning an IPO).
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pany’s management and other personnel involved in the deal,
most of whom will be unfamiliar with the world of capital mar-
kets.55  Both through advice and by example, the issuer’s law-
yers counsel the issuer’s management on how to deal with the
underwriters on issues related to due diligence, prospectus and
marketing disclosure, and the market norms for IPOs in a given
industry.56
The lawyers for both sides also play an important role in
conducting due diligence and drafting the prospectus.57  The
prospectus is usually drafted with participation of the lawyers,
bankers, and issuing company’s management, typically begin-
ning with a precedent and going through numerous iterations
of drafting, commenting, and revising until the preliminary ver-
sion to be filed with the SEC is complete.58  The counsel for the
company going public typically takes primary responsibility for
drafting most parts of the prospectus and has a great deal of
influence over the draft.59  However, the underwriter’s counsel
has a great deal of impact as well.60  SEC rules set out the
information to be disclosed61 and also require the inclusion of
55 See id.; see also Telephone Interview with Attorney (W) (name withheld by
request) (Feb. 2, 2014) (on file with author) [hereinafter Interview with W].
56 See Schneider et al., supra note 24, at 17–19 (“Management cannot prop- R
erly take a passive role and rely entirely upon counsel to identify the information
to be assembled, verify the information, and prepare the registration statement
properly.  Clients may have, quite appropriately, a different expectation of the
lawyer’s role relating to those parts of the prospectus which deal with primarily
‘legal’ matters such as descriptions of litigation, legal proceedings, tax conse-
quences of various transactions, interpretation of contracts, and descriptions of
governmental requirements.”).
57 See id. at 17.
58 See Barondes et al., supra note 27, at 167 (“This drafting is an iterative R
process, as knowledge gained in due diligence informs what needs to be said
about the issuer.”)
59 See Schneider et al., supra note 24, at 14–15 (“The ‘quarterback’ in prepar- R
ing the registration statement is normally the attorney for the company.  Com-
pany counsel is principally responsible for preparing the non-financial parts of
the registration statement.” (footnote omitted)).
60 See id. at 16 (“Close cooperation is required among counsel for the com-
pany, the underwriters’ counsel, the accountants, and the printer.”).
61 See Regulation S-K, Items 10–915, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.10–.915 (2016).  Re-
quired disclosure includes: (1) information about the company’s business, see
Regulation S-K, Items 101–03, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.101–.103; (2) the management’s
discussion and analysis of the financial condition of the company, including
future projections if desired, see Regulation S-K, Item 303, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.303;
(3) financial statements and an auditor’s opinion covering them, see Regulation S-
X, 17 C.F.R. § 210; (4) a description of material contracts, see Regulation S-K,
Items 101-915, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.101-.915; (5) information about legal and regula-
tory problems facing the company, see Regulation S-K, Item 103, 17 C.F.R.
§§ 229.103; (6) information about the officers and directors of the company and
their compensation, see Regulation S-K, Items 403-05, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.403-05;
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any information needed to make the disclosure in the prospec-
tus “not misleading.”62  The SEC reviews the preliminary pro-
spectus for conformity with its regulations, although it does not
typically pass judgment on the accuracy of the information it
contains.63
Counsel will also usually be very involved in the negotia-
tion of the underwriting agreement, which is the agreement
that governs the legal relationship between the underwriter
and the issuer.64  The underwriting agreement contains the
terms upon which the underwriter will purchase the shares at
an agreed-upon discount and distribute them to investors and
to other members of the underwriting syndicate, as well as
setting out the advising and marketing services that the under-
writer agrees to provide.65
C. Agency and Teamwork in IPOs
The relationships between the parties described in the pre-
ceding section differ from the relationships in other legal con-
texts.  Unlike the litigation or M&A contexts in which agents
represent interests that are clearly adverse to one another, in
the IPO context all the parties ultimately serve as agents of the
issuer.  The issuer hires the underwriter, and the underwriter’s
counsel works to help the underwriter serve as the issuer’s
agent.  The parties whose paths frequently cross understand
that their job is to reach a common goal, and they see their role
as ultimately serving the issuing company.66  This is important
for two reasons.  First, it gives rise to the expectation that all
parties will function cooperatively, thus elevating the impor-
tance of teamwork.
Second, because all parties purportedly work as agents of
the issuer, but in fact have divergent interests, the principal-
and certain industry specific information, see  Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Industry Guides, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.801-02.
62 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.408(a) (2016).
63 See Schneider et al., supra note 24, at 19–22 (discussing the SEC comment R
and review process); see also William W. Barker, SEC Registration of Public Offer-
ings Under the Securities Act of 1933, 52 BUS. LAW. 65 (1996) (describing the SEC
staff’s role in the registration and disclosure process).
64 See Schneider et al., supra note 24, at 16–17. R
65 See Griffith, supra note 17, at 592. R
66 See Schneider et al., supra note 24, at 19–22 (discussing the importance of R
the deal team having a common understanding of their goal for the deal to be
successful); Interview with W, supra note 55. R
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-5\CRN501.txt unknown Seq: 18 30-JUN-16 15:55
1246 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101:1229
agent problem67 is especially sharp but for the parties in the
deal to perceive.  The possibility of a principal-agency problem
(or the agency costs problem) arises whenever agents are hired
to perform “imperfectly observable discretionary actions that
affect the welfare of the principal.”68  Because the principal
does not have the skill to perform the task itself or to monitor
the performance of the agent, the agent may take actions for its
own benefit at the expense of the issuer.69  To be sure, agency
costs arise whether or not parties collaborate or perform tasks
in a group.  However, conditions like familiarity and cohesion
that make groups work well together can also undermine an
agent’s incentives to serve a principal in both overt and subtle
ways.  For instance, in the IPO context, lawyers for the issuer
may think they are serving their client by showing solicitude to
their counterparts and helping a deal to go smoothly, when in
reality it would be more in their client’s interests if the lawyers
pushed harder to secure better terms for the issuer.  More sub-
tly, but no less importantly, members of the issuing company’s
management frequently have no experience in capital markets
and look to their lawyers to guide them through the unfamiliar
terrain, explain what is “normal” or “market standard,” and
demonstrate how to interact with other parties to the deal.70  If
the issuer’s lawyers are deferential to their colleagues in the
banks or side with the banks whenever the issuer’s manage-
ment raises an objection to something that everyone else takes
for granted as part of the typical deal, the lawyers might inad-
vertently downplay the extent to which the incentives of the
banks and issuers diverge, at least on certain issues.  When
everyone on the deal team believes they are working toward the
same goal—which is nominally to serve the issuer—it may be
difficult to recognize the ways in which the team is not serving
the issuer well.  The team-like structure of an IPO makes it
more difficult for the issuer and its counsel to perceive where
its interests diverge from those of the underwriter, who appears
to be serving the issuer’s interests as part of the team.
Moreover, teamwork can diminish counsel’s ability and in-
centive to monitor the underwriter on behalf of the issuer.
Counsel’s ability to monitor can be compromised if counsel
foresees working for the underwriter again in the future and if
67 See Robert H. Sitkoff, An Economic Theory of Fiduciary Law, in PHILOSOPHI-
CAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 197, 198–200 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller
eds., 2014).
68 See id. at 198.
69 Id. at 198–99.
70 See Schneider et al., supra note 24, at 17–19. R
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the consequences of failing to monitor seem small because the
underwriter’s goals are purportedly in line with the issuer’s.71
The better the team dynamic among the repeat players in a
deal, the more likely it is that those same players will have less
incentive to monitor.  The key question is whether or not the
benefits of teamwork trump any possible agency costs that
come with it.
II
HYPOTHESES AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Drawing from the literature on social psychology as well as
empirical finance, I explore here hypotheses about the out-
comes of IPOs that can be used to assess the impact of collabo-
ration on lawyers’ agency.  By design, detailed accounts of the
meetings and telephone calls involved in a deal are usually not
kept or made available to the public.  Therefore, the analysis of
collaboration and team dynamics is necessarily indirect.  None-
theless, the indirect evidence provides insights into some of the
dynamics at work in a deal.
Methodologically, the research described below occurred
using the following steps.  First, I spoke with practitioners from
investment banks and law firms that represent issuers and
underwriters to find out what impact they thought teamwork
has, both positive and negative.72  I then looked at the litera-
ture on collaboration and teamwork to fit the practitioners’
insights into a theoretical framework and formulate general
hypotheses.  I also looked at the empirical corporate finance
literature to determine what sort of quantitative analysis has
been done, what sort of data can be analyzed that could provide
insight into the general hypotheses, and what kind of results
could be expected to support or refute the hypotheses.73  Fi-
nally, after gathering and analyzing the data, I again inter-
viewed practitioners to help further illuminate the results.
The methodology employed for this research undoubtedly
has limitations.  First, there is a relatively narrow set of IPO
outcomes that can be measured quantitatively, and they may
only tell part of the story with regard to collaboration or re-
peated interaction.  Second, despite robust efforts to eliminate
71 See Interview with W, supra note 55. R
72 As previously noted, this Article builds on earlier work on familiarity
among underwriters and their lawyers.  This methodology arose in part from that
research.
73 This component of the work builds upon research previously published by
the author, finding an effect from repeated interaction in dealmaking.
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errors in the interpretation of the results, such errors may
exist.  Third, interviews with practitioners may be subject to
cognitive bias or selective memory, despite efforts to ask ques-
tions openly and in a way that would not lead interviewees to
any particular answers.
Nonetheless, even given the inherent limitations of the re-
search method, the results and the analysis below are compel-
ling.  The many various quantitative tests, when considered
together, reveal a consistent story that fits well with the practi-
tioner accounts and the theoretical literature.  In addition, the
statistical results are robust, and withstand numerous tests
for bias, as well as tests to assess whether alternative interpre-
tations would be more appropriate.  The hypotheses tested, the
results, and the various checks are further described below.
A. Hypotheses on Team Dynamics and IPO Deal
Outcomes
The empirical and psychological research on teams sug-
gests that team members’ familiarity from working together
repeatedly is a critical component of teamwork.74  A group’s
repeated performance of a collective task is commonly assumed
to have positive benefits for the group’s ability to repeat that
task successfully.  However, the literature on teamwork pro-
vides a mixed picture on the impact of group repetition on
performance, highlighting upsides as well as potential
problems.75
1. Positive Effects of Repeated Interaction
To the extent that it is helpful, repeated activity among
members of a team or group improves team dynamics by help-
ing to build relationships amongst those working together re-
currently.76  The literature describes members’ repeated
interactions in pursuit of common goals to be essential inputs
to, and hallmarks of, a successful team, as measured by fac-
tors such as the speed and efficiency with which a group com-
74 See Hackman, supra note 22, at 250 (citing NTSB statistics that 73% of R
commercial aviation accidents in its database occurred on a crew’s first day flying
together, and 44% of those accidents happened on the crew’s very first flight; and
highlighting findings that airline crews and teams of doctors who have worked
together in the past perform significantly better, even when fatigued, than do
rested crews who have not worked together before).
75 Id. at 245–56.
76 See Kozlowski & Ilgen, supra note 15, at 81; see also Interview with D, R
supra note 39; Interview with W, supra note 55. R
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pletes a task and the quality of the output.77  These benefits
accrue for several reasons.  Most relevantly, groups benefit
from repeating complex tasks together because such activity
facilitates a shared understanding of the goals of those tasks,
what roles each group member will take on, and how people in
each role will leverage their particular skill or expertise.78  The
literature explains that repeated interaction allows some
processes to become routinized, so that each member of the
team can leverage his or her expertise more effectively on tasks
that cannot be routinized.79
Repeated interactions also help to create common norms of
communication and behavior, including a common language
for discussing the activity, and a common set of mental models
for performing a task.80  Perhaps most importantly, familiarity
establishes trust among the team’s members that does not
exist in the same sense that it does for non-group members.
The benefits of repeated interaction accrue most strongly when
group membership remains consistent from task to task: ex-
perimental studies suggest that when team members have
worked together repeatedly, replacing one team member with a
new person results in a loss of some of these gains from re-
peated interaction as the new member adjusts to an unfamiliar
group dynamic.81
77 See Kozlowski & Ilgen, supra note 15, at 77 (reviewing and providing a R
meta-analysis of fifty years of psychological research on teams).  According to this
literature, teams become cohesive as “task cycles . . . ’entrain’ the team to task
dynamics by making specific, iterative, and repeated demands on team processes
[that] . . . compile and improve as team members accrue experiences and learn
how to work together better.” Id. at 81 (citations omitted).  A theme in the litera-
ture is that teams function as a unit better the more their members interact: “[I]t
is also the case that the repeated interactions among individuals that constitute
processes tend to regularize, such that shared structures . . . crystallize and then
serve to guide subsequent process interactions.  Process begets structure, which
in turn guides process.” Id.; see also Hackman, supra note 22, at 246–55 (provid- R
ing examples of benefit from repeated interaction, while cautioning that more is
needed).
78 See Kozlowski & Ilgen, supra note 15, at 81; see also Schneider et al., R
supra note 24, at 17–19 (discussing the need for deal team members to have a R
common understanding of the tasks to be accomplished).
79 See Kozlowski & Ilgen, supra note 15, at 106 (“As dyadic interactions R
become routinized, the focal level of development shifts to the team.  A process of
network development yields a flexible network of role interdependencies that en-
ables continuous improvement and adaptability.”).
80 See id.
81 See id. at 86.  In one interesting experiment, teams were assembled to
create origami birds.  Teams gained efficiency from repeating the task together
multiple times, but they lost efficiency when members of the existing team were
replaced with new members. See id.
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2. Negative Effects from Repeated Interaction
Repeated interaction and teamwork may also have draw-
backs in a number of ways.  First, even very good team dynam-
ics can lead to groupthink—the tendency for members of a
group to converge on a set of ideas even when they are incor-
rect.82  This can compromise the ability of team members to
make independent judgments, which is particularly problem-
atic for lawyers, whose task is to protect their clients’ interests
within the group.  For example, lawyers, who are not accus-
tomed to judging the market impact of different types of disclo-
sure, may give undue deference to the wishes of the
underwriters who often take the lead in deciding on matters
such as precedent documents, pricing, and the types of infor-
mation about the issuer to disseminate.83  Second, some litera-
ture suggests that teams that work together frequently may
sabotage themselves by becoming overly risk averse.  When a
group performs a task several times successfully, for each ad-
ditional iteration of the task, group members will worry more
about disrupting the group dynamic and take fewer risks even
where they might be warranted, for fear of breaking what is
seen as a successful streak.84
In addition, familiarity may bring other drawbacks that,
while not directly related to team dynamics, are made more
pernicious and harder to detect in the context of teamwork.
The team atmosphere among repeat players in the IPO world
may undermine the ability of the issuer’s counsel to provide the
82 For a discussion of theory and research on groupthink, see generally Mar-
lene E. Turner & Anthony R. Pratkanis, Twenty-Five Years of Groupthink Theory
and Research: Lessons from the Evaluation of a Theory, 73 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV.
& HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 105, 105–15 (1998) (examining the historical develop-
ment of the groupthink model and the recent responses to the body of empirical
evidence amassed by it); see also IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUD-
IES OF POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOES 7–9 (2d ed., rev. 1983) (articulating first the
theory that groups converge on common ideas that are not always correct); Chip
Heath & Rich Gonzalez, Interaction with Others Increases Decision Confidence But
Not Decision Quality: Evidence Against Information Collection Views of Interactive
Decision Making, 61 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 305,
322–24 (1995).
83 A similar effect has been described as a symptom of “groupthink.” See
CASS R. SUNSTEIN & REID HASTIE, WISER: GETTING BEYOND GROUPTHINK TO MAKE
GROUPS SMARTER 15 (2015) (“[G]roups fall into herds, as group members follow the
statements and actions of those who speak or act first, even if those statements
and actions lead the group in unfortunate . . . directions.”).
84 See Lindred L. Greer, Heather M. Caruso & Karen A. Jehn, The Bigger They
Are, the Harder They Fall: Linking Team Power, Team Conflict, and Performance,
116 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 116, 124 (2011) (showing
the higher levels of well-processed conflict in teams fully explains better team
performance as compared to less successful teams).
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best representation by removing the incentive to take an adver-
sarial posture even when one is warranted.85  The effect of this
would be largely unintentional, indirect, and difficult to detect.
But if the lawyers for the issuer have a high degree of trust and
a sense of affiliation with the bankers on the deal, that may
make it difficult for the lawyers to think about the issuer’s
interests objectively.  They may instead take for granted that
the bank’s point of view is more persuasive and aligned with
industry norms.  The fact that the managers of issuing compa-
nies are often relatively new to capital markets deals com-
pounds the problem, since they rely on their counsel to
acclimate them to the norms of the market.86
The relational considerations of lawyers and clients across
the table may become more serious where the prospect of fu-
ture work hovers in the background.  While it is reasonable to
assume that few lawyers would intentionally prejudice a client,
and indeed none report doing so, it is easy to imagine subtle
impact of the desire to please the party across the table.  Mem-
bers of issuer’s management are in turn unable to adequately
evaluate the services they are being given and take cues from
their advisors about what to do.87
B. Quantitative Measures of Performance
If there are benefits to be gained or costs associated with
familiarity, one would expect to see better outcomes associated
with repeated interaction; if the costs described in the litera-
ture are present, we would expect to see them reflected in at
least some of the outcomes associated with high numbers of
repeated interaction, when other factors are held constant.  Of
course, selection is a concern with any such analysis, and sev-
eral strategies are used to rule out this possibility.
In order to assess these relational effects, I examine out-
comes that are frequently discussed in the empirical financial
literature on IPOs, applying similar methodology and in some
cases expanding on the methodology in that literature.  The
outcome variables described in this section are those for which
data are available and which might plausibly offer insight.  For
each outcome variable, I examine repeated interaction among
the following actors in typical IPO deals: (1) underwriter’s coun-
85 See infra Part IV.
86 See Interview with Attorney (K) (name withheld by request) (Sept. 16, 2013)
(on file with author) [hereinafter Interview with K].
87 See Schneider et al., supra note 24, at 8–9 (discussing the issuer’s reliance R
upon its advisors to guide it through the unfamiliar IPO process).
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sel’s prior IPO deals with the lead underwriter(s); (2) issuer’s
counsel’s prior deals across the table from the lead under-
writer(s); (3) issuer’s counsel’s prior IPO deals acting for the
lead underwriter as its counsel; and (4) issuer’s counsel’s prior
deals with the underwriter’s counsel.  These interactions were
chosen because they are most likely to reveal something about
the effect of repeated group interaction among lawyers, and
between lawyers and the underwriter.  Some of the hypotheses
and results discussed below build upon earlier work done by
the author with respect to the benefits of familiarity between
underwriters and their own counsel.  Small portions of those
results are repeated here because they help to interpret the
results reported below by comparison.
1. Accurate Pricing of the Deal
A key task that must be accomplished in any IPO is pricing
the deal, and the accuracy of the price can be an important
indicator of the deal’s success.88  The stock offering price is the
result of negotiations between the issuer (who would like the
price to be higher, all else equal) and the underwriter (who has
an incentive to underprice more strongly, all else equal).  This
is a challenging task because there is not yet a trading market
for the issuing company’s shares to use as a benchmark, and
only the issuer and underwriter possess much information
about the issuer and its business prospects.  Certainly, a
change in price accuracy associated with repeated interactions
would indicate an impact, although separating positive from
negative is more complicated, as discussed below.
a. Underpricing
The first component of pricing I examine is the amount of
the first-day price increase, or “underpricing.”  I examine
whether repeated interactions are associated with greater or
lesser degrees of underpricing (or pricing accuracy), and the
extent to which underpricing changes depending on which
types of actors are repeatedly collaborating.  The most basic
null hypothesis is that when issuer’s counsel interact repeat-
edly with other group members, issuers leave a consistent
amount of money on the table.  If the amount of money left on
the table changes with repeated interaction, it would support a
conclusion that familiarity has drawbacks or benefits.  This
88 See id. at 9–10.
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hypothesis is tested with respect to repeated interaction be-
tween various lawyer and banker pairings.
Numerous studies of IPO performance have looked at first-
day returns as a measure of how accurately priced (or under-
priced) an offering is.89  However, short-term price performance
is a complicated measure of deal success.  Good first-day per-
formance (reflected in a large price increase in the market once
the stock starts trading) is a sign of a good deal, especially if it
is sustained over time, because it reflects large demand for the
stock, which in turn relates to the deal team’s marketing efforts
and the disclosure the deal team creates and disseminates.
However, an overly large first-day return signals a poor out-
come for the issuing company, because the large return repre-
sents money that the issuing company is giving up, or “leaving
on the table,” as it is frequently described.90
Performance for the first day of trading is typically mea-
sured in the IPO literature by taking the difference between the
closing price on the first day of trading and the final offering
price.91  A large first-day price increase for a given stock can be
considered a positive result for the deal because it indicates
strong investor interest; however, any first-day price increase
also represents money that the issuing company could have
captured, and therefore at a large enough magnitude, the ini-
tial increase is a negative outcome for the issuer.92
Therefore, while the first-day price increase represents rev-
enue that the issuer could have had from the offering, one
cannot conclude that all underpricing is bad.  Bankers rou-
tinely attempt to underprice an IPO by approximately 15% be-
cause of the positive optics of a short-term rise in stock price
and the resulting momentum, and the need to generate public-
ity for the issue and demand from institutional investors.93
Managers of issuing companies similarly agree that some level
89 See HANDBOOK of CORPORATE FINANCE, supra note 13, at 263–75 (reviewing R
empirical studies of IPOs).
90 See Tim Loughran & Jay R. Ritter, Why Don’t Issuers Get Upset About
Leaving Money on the Table in IPOs?, 15 REV. FIN. STUD. 413, 413 (2002) (using the
term “money left on the table” to describe the aggregate proceeds foregone in
underpricing).
91 See Jay R. Ritter, The Long-Run Performance of Initial Public Offerings, 46 J.
FIN. 3, 3 (1991).
92 See Loughran & Ritter, supra note 90, at 414; see also Griffith, supra note R
17, at 600–30 (discussing the ways in which underpricing creates greater harm R
than good for issuers).
93 See Nocera, supra note 17, at 27 (Goldman Sachs Pitch Book describing a R
“discount,” usually 15% necessary to ensure adequate post-offering appetite for
stock); Telephone Interview with Attorney (S) (name withheld by request)  (July 23,
2013) (on file with author) [hereinafter Interview with S]; see also Griffith, supra
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of underpricing is beneficial to a degree, which may explain
why they tolerate a degree of it.94  Thus, up to a certain point,
the incentives of the issuer and the underwriter are aligned
with respect to underpricing.
The incentives of the issuer and the underwriter diverge
with respect to excessively high levels of underpricing, how-
ever. Excessive levels of underpricing above the standard 15%
arguably go beyond what is needed to ensure a successful deal
and are thus thought to represent an unnecessary but signifi-
cant loss to the issuer.95  On the other hand, with respect to
the underwriter, high levels of underpricing create substantial
benefits that frequently outweigh any losses they suffer from
forgone commissions.96  This is because the underwriter only
loses out on 7% (the typical underwriting commission) of the
underpriced amount, but at the same time gains substantial
benefits by allocating the underpriced stock to favored inves-
tors, who return the favor through future business and trading
commissions.97  Indeed, the underwriter has an incentive to
underprice far beyond what may be required to ensure a suc-
cessful deal.98
Consequently, drawing the line between a “good” first-day
price jump and a “bad” one is inherently difficult and depends
on whose perspective one takes.  As just explained, underwrit-
ers typically claim to intentionally underprice by 15% to ensure
note 17, at 599–612 (describing the potential benefits of underpricing to issuers, R
including positive signaling effects and rewarding investor disclosure of demand).
94 See Griffith, supra note 17, at 605–06 n.71 (citing Patricia A. Ryan & Irv R
DeGraw, A Brief Comparison of the Oct 2000-June 2002 IPO CFO Results to the
1996-1998 IPO CFO Results (working paper) (reporting that 70% of CFOs respond-
ing to a poll conducted in 2002 agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that
“high first day returns are necessary to gain interest  in the IPO”); see also Lough-
ran & Ritter, supra note 90, at 416 (explaining that it makes it easier to find R
buyers for IPOs and that, by underpricing, investors will engage in rent-seeking
behavior in order to improve their priority for receiving shares in coveted IPOs).
95 See Griffith, supra note 17, at 591–99. R
96 See id. at 590–99 (discussing benefits to underwriters from underpricing).
97 See id. at 593–94 (“[U]nderwriters may be able to increase profits above
their base compensation by engaging in underpricing.  This may seem contradic-
tory since, as noted above, underwriter compensation is a percentage of aggregate
offering proceeds, which are maximized by raising, not lowering, the offering price.
However, underpricing creates an additional profit opportunity for underwriters
by enabling the practice of spinning.”); Loughran & Ritter, supra note 18, at 8 R
(describing underpricing as a form of value transfer to the underwriter); Jay Ritter
& Ivo Welch, A Review of IPO Activity, Pricing, and Allocations, 57 J. FIN. 1795,
1815 (2002).  Compensation in the form of repeat business was a key issue in the
eToys litigation. See Nocera, supra note 17, at 1–8 (Goldman Sachs internal R
documents reflecting compensation “owed” to the bank from investors receiving
underpriced IPO allocations).
98 See Griffith, supra note 17, at 591–99. R
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-5\CRN501.txt unknown Seq: 27 30-JUN-16 15:55
2016] THE AGENCY COSTS OF TEAMWORK 1255
adequate demand and publicity in the market.99  Given the
inexactitude of the pricing process, this is roughly consistent
with the median level of underpricing in the dataset (11%).  One
way to separate the “correct” level of underpricing from levels
which are overly large would be to impose an arbitrary bound-
ary of 15%.  Such an arbitrary cutoff is bound to sweep in deals
for which underpricing was justifiably higher than the norm.
Nonetheless, once levels of underpricing become very high, it is
difficult to make the case that they were justified.
Another, perhaps more revealing, approach with respect to
group interaction is to examine the relative levels of underpric-
ing associated with repeated interactions of different actors in
the deal, or more precisely, to compare the change in levels of
underpricing that occur when different types of actors interact
repeatedly versus when they are relatively unfamiliar with each
other.  Both approaches are explored below.
b. Sustained Price Performance
In addition to first-day price performance and price correc-
tion, I also measure stock performance relative to the S&P 500
Index over the first thirty days, sixty days, and ninety days of
the stock’s public trading.  The purpose of measuring this is
twofold.  First, if the short-term returns on the newly issued
stock remain over longer time periods, it supports an inference
that the market has effectively absorbed the deal team’s infor-
mation product and that such information has turned out to be
accurate over the first few months.100  On the other hand, if the
large first-day increase dissipates over time, this is an indicator
of poor information availability at the time of the offering, either
because the information created by the deal team was poorly
absorbed by the market or turned out to be inaccurate, due to
insufficient due diligence or inadequate disclosure.101  Second,
if a stock issuance has a very high level of underpricing, and
the high price levels are sustained over time, it implies that the
underpricing is not merely an anomaly in the market but is
either intentional or a result of errors in the pricing process.
One interpretation of the underpricing phenomenon could also
99 See Loughran & Ritter, supra note 18, at 8 (“The resulting average level of R
underpricing should then be no more than several percent.  Thus, given the  use
of bookbuilding, the joint hypothesis that issuers desire to maximize their pro-
ceeds and that underwriters act in the best interests of issuers can be  rejected
whenever average underpricing exceeds several percent.”).
100 See Schneider et al., supra note 24, at 12–13 (discussing the role of disclo- R
sure in the market’s reaction to securities prices).
101 See id.
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be that it represents a reasonable, if conservative, approach to
pricing by the investment banks, who must bear the risk of
selling all of the stock in a firm commitment underwriting.
They may worry that setting the price too high could result in
an incomplete uptake of stock by investors.102  However, if a
stock rises by an excessive amount on the first day, and its
performance remains strong over the first several months of
trading, it further indicates that a conservative approach was
unwarranted, suggesting either an egregious error on the part
of the bank or self-interested pricing behavior on the part of a
bank trying to capture value out of the deal from the issuer.
Overall, positive effects from teamwork should reveal sus-
tained good performance over the long term.  Good long-term
performance may also reveal overly high levels of underpricing,
however, and would therefore be an indication of a transfer of
wealth from the issuer to the underwriter and investors.  Indi-
cations of what the thirty-, sixty- and ninety-day market per-
formance results imply can be further assessed by looking at
other factors such as the incidence of securities litigation
against the issuer within a short period of time following the
IPO.
c. Price Revision
In order to help separate the negative implications of un-
derpricing from the positive implications of an early price in-
crease, I examine whether repeated interaction has any effect
on the propensity for the issuer and underwriter to agree to a
correct upward price revision—that is, an upward revision from
the initial offer range in the preliminary prospectus that also
corresponds to a price increase in the market.
Upward price revision indicates two things: the first is
greater-than-expected demand for the issuer’s stock, which in
turn can be interpreted as a result of a good marketing effort
that generates high pre-market demand, good disclosure that
gives investors confidence in the issue, and information discov-
ery that aids in the correction of early pricing errors.103  The
second is that the issuing company has been able to capture at
least some of the value of the increase in demand, because a
higher offering price will mean more proceeds for its coffers.
Therefore, if repeated interaction has an effect on the propen-
102 See Loughran & Ritter, supra note 90, at 416. R
103 See Kathleen Weiss Hanley, The Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings and
the Partial Adjustment Phenomenon, 34 J. FIN. ECON. 231, 232 (1993) (describing
how greater-than-anticipated demand results in upward price adjustment).
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sity to adjust price upward, it indicates a well-performing deal
in which the issuer has been able to capture more value from
the deal—an overall positive result.
By contrast, if a deal performs extremely well in the market
but there is no upward revision in the final price, it indicates
either that the parties have made an error in their projections
about the market performance of the stock or that the parties
willfully decided to deprive the issuer of proceeds it could have
had.104  The latter scenario is consistent with a situation in
which the underwriter is capturing value for its clients at the
expense of the issuer.
2. Securities Class Action Litigation
The filing of securities litigation soon after the IPO is a poor
deal outcome in the sense that it indicates that stock prices for
IPO companies have fallen105 and some plausible defect in the
disclosure is present that is related to the price drop.106  Al-
though the filing of litigation can be precipitated by numerous
factors outside the control of the members of a deal team, an
increased occurrence of litigation when controlling for other
factors107 implicates the lawyers’ performance in the deal,
since uncovering information through due diligence and limit-
104 Cf. Janet Cooper Alexander, The Lawsuit Avoidance Theory of Why Initial
Public Offerings Are Underpriced, 41 UCLA L. REV. 17, 66 (1993) (discussing a
theory of underpricing as an artifact of error, combined with abundance of
caution).
105 A fall in the price of the issuer’s stock is the basis for the damages sought
in most lawsuits. See id. at 35 (“[T]here is no legal basis for suing because a
security was priced too high—either in the sense that the open-market price was
lower than  the  offering  price, or that  the  offering  price was higher than the
‘intrinsic’ value.”).
106 See Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2012) (requiring a
misstatement or omission in the registration statement as a prerequisite to legal
action); Securities Act of 1933 § 12 (requiring a misstatement or omission in a
prospectus or oral communication as a prerequisite to legal action); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2014); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(2016) (providing for liability for any material misstatement or omission or scheme
to defraud).
Class actions were filed within one year with respect to 119 of the issuers in
the dataset, after discounting multiple separate class actions filed with respect to
the same issuer.  This number constitutes 4.4% of the dataset.
107 Primary factors identified in the literature bearing a relationship to litiga-
tion include the size of the deal (as the log of gross proceeds), the total assets of
the company after the IPO, the market capitalization of the issuer after the IPO,
and the market share of the underwriter, reflecting the intuition that companies
with “deep pockets” draw more litigation. See Michelle Lowry & Susan Shu,
Litigation Risk and IPO Underpricing, 65 J. FIN. ECON. 309, 315–19 (2002).  These
factors are used as controls in the regression analysis discussed below.
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ing liability through accurate disclosure is one of the lawyers’
key tasks.108
A few caveats are in order with respect to litigation as an
indicator.  First, securities litigation can occur based on peri-
odic disclosure or other statements made by the issuer and
may have nothing to do with the IPO.109  When securities law-
suits allege causes of action under sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of
the Securities Act, they necessarily relate to disclosure that
was produced as part of the offering.  Nonetheless, class ac-
tions often also allege liability under Rule 10b-5, as there are
often procedural hurdles to bringing an action under sections
11 and 12.110
In addition, it is entirely possible that such lawsuits have
limited or no merit.  Spurious litigation was a central concern
voiced by Congress when it passed the Private Securities Litiga-
tion Reform Act of 1995.111  The possibility that meritless law-
suits are included in the data cannot be ruled out, and thus
some of the data may not be indicative of a poor deal outcome.
Nonetheless, it is reasonable to assume that lawsuits filed do,
on average, have at least arguable merit and basis in the disclo-
sure.  As a robustness measure, I limit the dataset to class
actions filed within the first year after the IPO, even though the
statute of limitations for actions under sections 11 and 12 is
the shorter of one year after the discovery of the facts giving rise
to a claim of material misstatement or omission,112 or three
years, and the shorter of two years after the discovery of facts
giving rise to a claim of material misstatement or omission, or
five years for actions under Rule 10b-5.113  Although using all
of the class actions would provide even stronger results, limit-
ing them helps to ensure that lawsuits in the dataset are more
likely to be meritorious and related to the initial offering.114
108 See Schneider et al., supra note 24, at 4–5. R
109 See Marilyn F. Johnson et al., Do the Merits Matter More? The Impact of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 627, 627–30 (2007)
(documenting the prevalence of lawsuits based on earning statements, particu-
larly where they have been revised).
110 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C §§ 77k(a) (standing requirement); § 77(l)(2) (requirement
for purchase pursuant to a prospectus); § 77(m) (statute of limitations for §§ 11
and 12).
111 See Joshua D. Fulop, Agency Costs and the Strike Suit: Reducing Frivolous
Litigation Through Empowerment of Shareholders, 7 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 213, 213–14
(2007) (describing the strike suit problem).
112 15 U.S.C. § 77(m) (2012).
113 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b) (2012).
114 See id.
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The second caveat regarding litigation is that the filing of a
lawsuit, even if meritorious, is not necessarily an indicator of
defects in the performance of the lawyers.  Many factors
outside of the control of legal counsel might contribute.  None-
theless, part of the lawyers’ duty is to insulate the company
from litigation, especially spurious litigation through disclo-
sure.115  Thus, when controlling for factors that typically at-
tract litigation, one might hypothesize that there would be less
litigation associated with lawyer repeated interaction, if it is the
case that familiarity is beneficial.  Nonetheless, if repeated in-
teractions are associated with more class actions after holding
other factors relevant to litigation constant, it provides another
piece of evidence pointing to negative effects of group work.
3. Prospectus Disclosure
As a key marketing document, regulatory filing, and point
of focus for telling the issuer’s story to the market, the disclo-
sure can have a significant impact on transaction outcomes.  In
a sense, the disclosure is a proxy for the performance of the
various deal participants, and in particular the lawyers in the
deal, since lawyers are the chief drafters of the document and
conduct much of the due diligence investigation that forms the
basis of the disclosure.116
It is difficult to measure the quality of disclosure in the
aggregate.  However, other studies have used measures of posi-
tive disclosure and negative disclosure to glean information
about the information content of prospectuses.117  These mea-
sures typically involve looking at the ratios of portions of the
prospectus considered negative, primarily the risk factors, to
all other portions of the prospectus.118  Although this is a very
rough measure, it provides a basic idea of the informational
completeness of the prospectus, as well as the deal team’s per-
ception of the risks of the company.
115 See Telephone Interview with Attorney (F) (name withheld by request) (Oct.
20, 2013) (on file with author) [hereinafter Interview with F].
116 See Schneider et al., supra note 24, at 16 n.10. R
117 See, e.g., Kathleen Weiss Hanley & Gerard Hoberg, The Information Content
of IPO Prospectuses, 23 R. FIN. STUD. 2821, 2830–40 (2010); James C. Spindler,
IPO Underpricing, Disclosure, and Litigation Risk 9 (U.S.C. Ctr. L. Econ. & Org.,
Research Paper No. 09-9, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1396818
[https://perma.cc/PHH4-L44V]; see also Tom Arnold et al., The Effects of Ambig-
uous Information on Initial and Subsequent IPO Returns, 39 FIN. MGMT 1497,
1497–1519 (2010) (reviewing past studies and claiming that ambiguity in pro-
spectuses promotes underpricing).
118 See Spindler, supra note 117, at 9–10 (employing an approach looking at R
ratios of positive to negative disclosure).
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The proportion of negative disclosure in a document, all
else equal, is also an indirect way to examine the lawyers’ abil-
ity and willingness to carry out an issuer’s wishes.  The disclo-
sure is chiefly drafted by the lawyers and the underwriter
acting in concert—and sometimes in tension—with personnel
from the issuing company.  Capital markets lawyers report that
issuing companies’ management often push to provide copious
positive disclosure about their companies, while the underwrit-
ers and lawyers try to limit and temper the disclosure by in-
cluding more negative information, ostensibly for the purpose
of warding off liability.  The parties’ conflicting goals regarding
disclosure manifest most palpably in the risk factor section of
the prospectus, the drafting of which is driven by the under-
writers and counsel.119  Risk factors relating to a company and
its business are required to be disclosed by the Securities Act
and the SEC’s regulations. Moreover, risk disclosure is thought
to protect issuers from lawsuits by providing adequate warn-
ings and meaningful cautionary language with respect to the
other disclosure in the prospectus, especially projections for
future company performance and forward-looking state-
ments.120  However, the extent to which risk factors are pro-
phylactic is unclear, and it is possible that they merely shift the
basis for litigation to other elements of the disclosure.121  This
conclusion is supported by at least some work in financial
economics that has found evidence that greater risk factor dis-
closure may actually encourage litigation by obfuscating mate-
rial risks related to the issuer.122
In addition, negative disclosure in the risk factors can
lower the price that investors are willing to pay for the stock.
Risk disclosure thus might be protective, but overlawyering,
overreliance on precedent or boilerplate, or grandstanding with
respect to risk factors can be very costly for the issuer.  Thus,
risk disclosure is a somewhat rough and ambiguous measure
of the team performance of lawyers in repeated interactions.
High levels of risk disclosure indicate counsel who were able to
prevail over issuers’ preferences to present a positive picture of
the company.  That might be good if it reduces litigation risk,
119 See id.; see also Hanley & Hoberg, supra note 117, at 2830 (using text R
analysis to identify influences on disclosure).
120 See Spindler, supra note 117, at 10. R
121 Cf. Johnson et al., supra note 109, at 627 (noting a shift in the basis of R
liability claims to earnings statements).
122 See Hanley & Hoberg, supra note 117, at 2830 (discussing evidence that R
disclosure is a factor contributing to uncertainty).
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but very high levels of risk disclosure might cost issuers more
than they are worth through lost proceeds.
4. Length of Time to Offering
The length of time between the issuer’s filing of Form S-1
with the SEC provides an indication of the efficiency with which
a deal group is working.  The filing of the S-1 allows the IPO
marketing effort to commence and typically occurs between
one and three months before the ultimate offering date but may
be much longer.123  Although many factors can cause a deal to
be delayed outside the control of the parties at the table, such
as market conditions,124 comments from the SEC,125 or
problems within the issuing company, it is reasonable to hy-
pothesize that good team dynamics might have a systematic
effect on the efficiency with which the deal is closed.126  There-
fore, a systematic increase in deal length might indicate re-
duced teamwork, while a systematic decrease in deal length
would indicate positive benefits of improved teamwork.127
III
DATA AND ANALYSIS
The following discussion explains the empirical findings of
this study and their implications for the hypotheses developed
above.  The section sets out the sources of data and methodol-
ogy, and describes the results from regression analyses for the
interactions between underwriter’s counsel’s and the lead un-
derwriter(s) with the issuer’s counsel and underwriter’s coun-
123 GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, IPO GUIDEBOOK 8 (2015).
124 Schneider et al., supra note 24, at 24–25 (“[I]f market conditions have R
worsened materially after the letter of intent stage, the issue must either come to
the market at a price below that originally contemplated, or it must be postponed
until conditions improve.”).
125 Id. at 27 (“There is a wide variation in the time required for the SEC to
process a registration statement.  Relevant factors include the level of the Com-
mission’s backlog of filings and the time of the year.  There is normally a consider-
able rush of filings at the end of each calendar quarter, and particularly at the end
of March for filings with financial statements as of December 31.  The SEC’s
current policy calls for the issuance of an initial letter of comments within thirty
days of the filing of a registration statement, but the delay is often longer and at
times has exceeded one hundred days.”).
126 This conclusion comports with practitioner descriptions of the essential
characteristics of a smooth deal. See, e.g., id. at 16–17 (“Close cooperation is
required among counsel for the company, the underwriters’ counsel, the account-
ants, and the printer.  Unless each knows exactly what the others expect, addi-
tional delay, expense, and irritation are predictable.”).
127 This analysis expands on previous work done by the author. See Jeremy
R. McClane, The Sum of Its Parts: The Lawyer-Client Relationship in Initial Public
Offerings, 84 FORDHAM L. REV., 131, 170 (2015).
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sel.  I analyze each type of repeated interaction with respect to
the performance variables, noting the implications for the vari-
ous hypotheses regarding the benefits or drawbacks of close
relational dynamics and teamwork.
The data on IPOs used in this Article were drawn from
interviews with lawyers and investment bankers in several
large firms based in New York, London, Washington, D.C., and
Palo Alto, CA.  The quantitative data was gathered from a num-
ber of publicly available sources.  The basis for the list of IPOs
is the Kenney-Patton database of de novo128 IPOs in the United
States from June 1996 through December 2010.129  The deals
from that dataset were cross-checked with the Thomson One
dealsheet record to confirm the date, ticker, and issuer
name.130  From Thomson One, I added the names of the banks
involved in the underwriting syndicate for each deal, including
the names of the lead underwriters, bookrunners or joint book-
runners, the lead underwriters’ counsel and issuers’ counsel,
data about the involvement of venture capitalists, as well as the
age of the issuing company.  From the same source I also ob-
tained the initial price range filed with the SEC, as well as the
final price agreed by the issuer and underwriters, from which I
determined whether the final price was revised up or down
from the initial range.  Twenty-two records were dropped either
because information could not be found on the issue in the
Thomson One database or because the Center for Research in
Security Prices (“CRSP”) database did not contain information
on the initial or final price.  This resulted in a dataset consist-
ing of 2,265 IPOs spanning fifteen years.
I then gathered each company’s registration document (the
Form S-1, or its equivalent) and prospectus from the SEC’s
EDGAR database.131  From these documents, I gathered the
names of the attorneys for both issuers and underwriters, as
128 The database excludes offerings of capital trusts, securitizations, IPOs of
preferred stock, and spin-offs.
129 For more information on the database, see Martin Kenney & Donald Pat-
ton, Guide to the Firm Database of Emerging Growth Initial Public Offerings (IPOs)
from 1990 Through 2010, U.C. DAVIS (Sept. 2013), http://hcd.ucdavis.edu/
faculty/webpages/kenney/misc/Firm_IPO_Database_Guide.pdf [https://perma
.cc/TNU5-DLMK].
130 Thomson ONE, Trusted Investment Research Tools, THOMSON REUTERS,
http://financial.thomsonreuters.com/en/products/tools-applications/trading-
investment-tools/thomson-one-investment-research-tools.html?gclid=CjwKEAiA
x4anBRDz6JLYjMDxoQYSJAA4loRmqel_bXT8gpjPqFxMyt6A9VmdVOXXoM_u9o
MbvA_3EhoCJdvw_wcB (last visited Apr. 9, 2016) [perma.cc/32H7-K3V5] [herein-
after Thomson One Database].
131 EDGAR: Company Filings, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/
companysearch.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2016) [perma.cc/7QXZ-464P].
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well as data on the geographic location of the law firms and the
underwriters.  From the prospectuses I gathered word counts
for each document and for each individual section of the docu-
ment.  The word counts ignore information contained in tables
and charts, which is consistent with methodology used in other
research on IPOs.  The rationale is that pure word counts,
while constituting a very rough estimate of the types of disclo-
sure included, are objective and do not suffer from the potential
bias associated with hand-coded disclosure elements.132
I used information from the CRSP database to obtain data
on each stock’s performance over time.133  Data on class action
litigation was taken from the Stanford Law School Securities
Class Action Clearinghouse.134  From Compustat, I then gath-
ered data on company assets, book value per share, leverage,
and fees paid to counsel.
The identities of each IPO’s lead underwriters were taken
from this data set.  An investment bank is considered a lead
underwriter if it is either the sole bookrunner or a joint book-
runner.135  Where investment banks merge with other banks, I
treat each merging bank as though it has disappeared and the
newly merged bank as if it is a new bank.  I use this method to
maintain a conservative approach to tracking repeat transac-
tions between investment banks and law firms.  Where there is
more than one bookrunner, observations are de-weighted
accordingly.
The identity of counsel for the lead underwriters and issu-
ing companies are similarly taken from this data.136  As with
132 See Spindler, supra note 117, at 910 (noting that this method “has the R
advantage of being objective, as it does not rely upon subjective evaluations of
particular disclosures (such as coding a line of disclosure as ‘good’ or ‘bad’) and
does not require subjective index weighting”).
Word counts for this study were taken for a total of 2,258 prospectuses.  A
small number (7) of prospectuses were excluded due to transcription errors in the
database.
133 CRSP US Stock Databases, CTR. RES. SEC. PRICES http://www.crsp.com/
products/research-products/crsp-us-stock-databases (last visited Apr. 9, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/M2HL-2MM4].
134 Stanford Law School, Securities Class Action Clearinghouse: A Collabora-
tion with Cornerstone Research, STANFORD, http://securities.stanford.edu (last
visited Apr. 9, 2016) [https://perma.cc/FZE5-9MG3].
135 This methodology is similar to that used in prior work. See, e.g., Loughran
& Ritter, supra note 18, at 13 (describing the relationship between lead under- R
writer and bookrunner designations in empirical work).  The most frequent lead
underwriters are Goldman Sachs (217), Merrill Lynch (154), Morgan Stanley
(137), Lehman Brothers (131), and JP Morgan (122).
136 The most frequent managers’ counsel are Wilson Sonsini Goodrich &
Rosati (176), Latham & Watkins (160), Davis Polk & Wardwell (151), Cravath,
Swaine & Moore (111), and Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom (106).
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investment banks, law firm mergers are treated as the disap-
pearance of each old firm and the appearance of a new firm.  In
the rare cases of multiple firms representing a party, the firms
are treated as a single unit for that transaction.
Combinations of underwriters, their counsel, and issuer’s
counsel are grouped together, and then the offer date is used to
construct variables representing how often a certain under-
writer-counsel and counsel-counsel pair have worked together
in the previous one year, two years, and three years for each
new issue.  Further, names of individual counsel collected from
the Form S-1 documents filed with the SEC137 are then
matched based on whether the same individuals were present
on a deal in which the same law firms were involved, and a
variable is created to represent the number of repeat deals in
which at least one individual attorney from a given firm ap-
pears in successive deals.
A. Empirical Results
1. Regression Analysis on Performance Metrics
For each type of repeated interaction observed in the data
(underwriters with their own counsel, underwriters’ en-
counters with the issuer’s counsel on opposite sides of a deal,
the underwriters’ encounters with issuer’s counsel when is-
suer’s counsel has recently been the underwriter’s counsel,
and frequent encounters between the two sets of counsel), I
analyze price performance, probability of correct price revision,
incidence of litigation, and length of time to complete a transac-
tion.  Some of the results with respect to the interactions be-
tween investment banks and their own counsel have been
reported in my previous research.  I repeat them briefly here for
the sake of comparison because they are helpful for under-
standing the implications of the new findings.
With regard to price performance of the IPO stock, the time
to deal completion, and the proportion of various types of dis-
closure, I employ ordinary least squares (“OLS”) regression
analysis138 to estimate the relationship between repeated inter-
actions and the outcomes of interest.  For price performance,
the outcomes measured are the first-day bounce—the stock
137 My thanks go to Robert Bartlett III for this suggestion.
138 See Appendix Table 1 for the formal model and variables used in OLS
regressions.  OLS is a statistical method that attempts to determine the relation-
ship between a set of explanatory variables and an outcome variable of interest,
by finding a function that approximately fits a set of data. See JEFFREY M. WOOL-
DRIDGE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF CROSS SECTION AND PANEL DATA 53 (2d ed. 2010).
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price increase during the first day of trading (See Appendix
Table 1), as well as the price change after thirty, sixty, and
ninety days of trading, all relative to the performance of the
S&P Index to account for the effect of overall market move-
ments (See Appendix Table 2).  For the time to deal completion,
the outcome measured is the number of days from the filing of
the S-1 until the offering date.  With respect to disclosure, the
relevant outcomes are the proportion of each prospectus occu-
pied by risk factors, business descriptions, and management’s
discussion and analysis.
With respect to the probability of price correction (See Ap-
pendix Table 3) as well as class action litigation (See Appendix
Table 4), I employ probit models.139  For upward price revision,
the model estimates the change in probability that the pricing
negotiation will result in higher price than that set out in the
initial filing range, when the market performance is good
enough that it would justify a higher price and when parties
have worked together repeatedly.  With respect to litigation, the
model estimates the change in probability that a securities
class action lawsuit will be filed in the first six months, and the
first year after the IPO offer date when parties have worked
together repeatedly.
The models each incorporate a number of other indepen-
dent variables, in line with prior empirical literature on
IPOs.140  These include fixed effects141 for IPO year and the
issuing company’s industry (as determined according to the
139 See Appendix Table 2 for the formal probit model and variables used.  A
probit model is a statistical model in which the outcome variable can take on only
one of two values; it is useful for estimating the probably of an event occurring,
versus the probability of the event not occurring. See WOOLDRIDGE, supra note
138, at 471, 561. R
140 See, e.g., Hanley & Hoberg, supra note 117, at 2830–33; see also HANDBOOK R
of CORPORATE FINANCE, supra note 13, at 276–79 (summarizing empirical evidence R
from prior studies on the determinants of underpricing of IPOs).
141 See WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 138, at 300.  Fixed effects provide a method of R
controlling for variation within certain categories of variable by removing the
mean of the observations for the dependent variable of interest.  For example, in
an OLS regression using first-day price jump (i.e., underpricing) as the dependent
variable, fixed effects for (inter alia) each year are used.  This allows for variation
in overall underpricing from year to year by removing the mean underpricing for
each year and controlling for the variation in underpricing that is specific to that
particular year.  For example, if 1999 was a year that saw a particularly large
amount of underpricing, the fixed effect would remove the year-specific average of
the underpricing and leave only the variation attributable to other factors.  The
same is done for each IPO quarter, each lead underwriter, each industry, and the
interaction of each industry and year.
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Standard Industry Classification, or “SIC,” code142 as well as
other classifications used in the literature) to control for mar-
ket conditions that changed over time and in various indus-
tries.  I also use fixed effects for each investment bank in order
to allow for variation in outcome variables associated with each
lead underwriter, as well as the interaction between the year,
industry, and underwriter variables.  In addition, for all specifi-
cations I control for the IPO size measured in terms of the
natural log of the gross proceeds of the offering, a variable
frequently used as a proxy for deal quality, as well as the size of
the issuing company.143
I perform each analysis using a number of alternative spec-
ifications to test the robustness of the model.  Appendix Tables
7 and 8 report the results of these robustness checks for analy-
sis of the first-day price increase and the probability of litiga-
tion under the alternative specifications.
a. Pricing Accuracy and Market Performance
This section will describe the results for each set of re-
peated interactions with respect to first-day performance, and
performance relative to the rest of the market at thirty, sixty,
and ninety days post-offering.
For each set of parties studied (the underwriter(s) and un-
derwriter’s counsel, the underwriter(s) and issuer’s counsel,
underwriter’s counsel and issuer’s counsel) there is a signifi-
cant first-day price jump for deals in which the parties have
worked together repeatedly—the stock’s price in the market
increases significantly over the initial offering price in the pro-
spectus.144  Regression analysis reveals a pattern in which
each successive IPO deal that two of the parties have done in
the past year is associated with an incrementally larger in-
crease in the first-day price jump.
The graphs below illustrate the patterns with respect to
first-day price increase found in the raw data.  Figure 1 shows
the percentage change in opening day price jump for an IPO
142 SIC codes are used to categorize the industry of issuing companies and are
assigned for each securities issuer. See Barker, supra note 63, at 68. R
143 In line with the financial economic literature on IPOs, the regressions
described in this Article use the natural log of the gross proceeds of each IPO in
order to mitigate skewness in the distribution of dollar amounts. See HANDBOOK of
CORPORATE FINANCE, supra note 13, at 276–79.  In the alternative specifications in R
Appendix Tables 7 and 8, I also use the size of the company (measured by total
assets) and the book value per share as alternative ways to control for deal
quality.  These yield the same results.
144 See Appendix Table 1.
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stock in which the various parties to the deal have worked
together between one and five-plus times within the previous
year.  The relationship evident between repeated interactions
and the opening day jump continues to hold in regression anal-
yses that control for many factors that may also influence the
opening day price jump, which are detailed below.
FIGURE 1. REPEATED LAWYER INTERACTIONS AND OPENING DAY
PRICE INCREASE
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i. Underwriter and Underwriter’s Counsel
The IPO stock’s opening day price performance (or
“bounce”) and its relation to the number of times the under-
writer and its counsel have worked together across different
time periods is the first performance measure analyzed.  Panel
A of Appendix Table 1 shows the results, demonstrating a
strong and significant effect from increased bank-counsel in-
teractions, even after year, industry, and bank fixed effects as
well as other controls are used.  Each additional IPO that the
underwriter and its counsel have done together in the past year
is associated with a 3.1% to 5.1% higher opening day price
jump.  For deals in the past two years, each additional deal is
associated with an average 1.9% to 3.6% additional price jump;
for deals in the past three years, the increase is 1.5% to
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2.9%.145  When only deals in which specific lawyers can be
identified appear repeatedly, the results remain significant,
and the marginal increase becomes 11.2% to 14.0% for deals in
the past year and 7.7% to 9.7% for deals in the preceding three
years.  The fact that the magnitude increases when interac-
tions between individual lawyers are analyzed may be a result
of the fact that the confidence intervals are large for these
estimates.  Nonetheless, they are still statistically significant,
further indicating that the interpersonal interactions are driv-
ing the results.
The next performance measure to be examined is the per-
centage price change of the issued stock over the first thirty,
sixty, and ninety trading days, relative to the percentage
change in the S&P Index over the same set of days.  The con-
trols in all cases are dummy variables146 for the IPO year, the
SIC category, and the interaction of those two sets.147  These
controls are consistent with the financial economic literature
on IPOs.148  Clustered robust standard errors are used for each
regression.149
For the thirty-, sixty-, and ninety-day price performance,
the upward trend in first-day price increase remains evi-
dent.150  The effect of each additional interaction on the relative
change in a stock’s price with respect to the S&P Index after
thirty trading days is 4.4% when the interactions are within the
past year.  This number drops to 2.8% when the interaction is
in the past three years.  Fewer recent interactions between a
bank and law firm are associated with lower price performance
over the thirty-, sixty-, and ninety-day periods.  The effect re-
mains strong for the first ninety days of trading, for which each
deal in the past year is associated with a 7.4% increase, declin-
145 See Appendix Table 1, Panel A1.  The two specifications look at the number
of prior deals between the underwriter and its counsel within the past year, two
years, and three years preceding any IPO.  Specifications are shown with and
without fixed effects for each underwriter.
146 See Appendix Table 1, Panel A2.
147 When fixed effects for each bank are introduced, the result remains, but
the significance diminishes.
148 See, e.g., Spindler, supra note 117, at 18 (detailing the use of dummy R
variables to control for certain offering and issuer characteristics).
149 In addition, to eliminate the possibility of clustering with respect to indus-
try, bank, and year, each regression uses clustered robust standard errors.  See
A. Colin Cameron, Jonah B. Gelbach & Douglas L. Miller, Robust Inference with
Multi-way Clustering 2–4 (U.C. Davis Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 09-9,
2009), http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/58397/1/609322079.pdf
[http://perma.cc/EMK5-HKNX].  My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this
suggestion.
150 See Appendix Table 2, Panel A1.
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ing to a 4.1% increase in relative price for deals completed
together within the preceding three years.  These results re-
main when deals are analyzed for which individual lawyers can
be identified.
ii. Underwriter’s Counsel and Issuer’s Counsel
The second set of interactions I analyze is that between the
two sets of counsel to each deal, again in relation to the issued
stock’s first-day price jump.  The results once again demon-
strate a significant effect, albeit smaller than the one observed
for the underwriter and its counsel alone.151  Each additional
IPO that the two sets of lawyers have done together in the past
year is associated with a 2.3% to 3.3% higher opening day price
jump.  For deals in the past two years, each additional deal is
associated with an average 1.4–2.1% additional price jump; for
deals in the past three years, the increase is 1.1–1.6%.  When
the set of deals is narrowed to those for which individual law-
yers can be identified working together repeatedly, the margi-
nal increase is much higher: 69.0–69.2% for each repeat deal
in the past one year, and 47.5–51.7% on average repeat deals
in the past three years.  The effect is sustained for the first
thirty, sixty, and ninety days of trading.152  Once again, the
larger estimates when individual lawyers are analyzed must be
viewed in light of the fact that the confidence intervals are
large, and there are fewer repeated interactions among lawyers
whose identities can be confirmed from the S-1.  The large
number is therefore not necessarily indicative of the typical
increase one would associate with each repeated interaction.
Nonetheless, the estimates are still statistically significant, fur-
ther indicating that the interpersonal interactions among
counsel contribute to the results.
iii. Underwriter and Issuer’s Counsel
For each IPO, I also look at whether the issuer’s counsel
has been issuer’s counsel in past transactions involving the
same underwriter.  For instance, in a given deal, if WilmerHale
is the issuer’s counsel and Morgan Stanley is the underwriting
bank, I look at the number of prior IPOs in the past year, two
years, and three years in which WilmerHale represented an
issuer and Morgan Stanley led the deal.
151 See Appendix Table 1, Panel C1, C2.
152 See Appendix Table 2, Panel C1, C2.
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For these parties, the relationship between opening day
price jump and recent deals together has a relatively large mag-
nitude compared to the other sets of interactions discussed so
far.  Each additional IPO in the past year is associated with a
6.7–8.2% higher opening day price jump.  For deals in the past
two years, each additional deal is associated with an average
4.8–6.6% additional price jump; for deals in the past three
years, the increase is 3.7–5.6%.153  When individual lawyers
are matched in repeated deals, the associated marginal price
increase is much larger: from 24.4–31.9% for repeated interac-
tions in the past year, and 12.8–19.0% for repeated interac-
tions in the preceding three years.
A similar result is observed for the percentage price change
over the first thirty, sixty, and ninety trading days, relative to
the percentage change in the S&P Index over the same set of
days.154  The controls in all cases are dummies for the IPO
year, the SIC category, and the interaction of those two sets.
The average marginal price increase at thirty days is 12.2% for
each additional interaction across the table within the past
year, declining to 7.3% for interactions within the past three
years.  The ninety-day marginal price increase relative to the
S&P Index is 14.5% for additional interactions in the preceding
year, dropping to 9.1% for interactions within the past three
years.155
iv. Underwriter and Issuer’s Counsel “Conflict” Deals
To assess across-the-table interactions more thoroughly, I
look at a subset of the transactions in which the issuer’s coun-
sel has not only encountered the underwriter previously but
has served as the same underwriter’s counsel recently.  I define
“recent” to be within the past year.  For instance, in the exam-
ple from the preceding section, if WilmerHale is issuer’s coun-
sel and Morgan Stanley is the underwriting bank, I look at
whether or not WilmerHale has acted as Morgan Stanley’s
counsel in an IPO within the preceding year.  For ease of refer-
ence, I call these “conflict” deals because of the potential for a
conflict of interest.156  As before, I control for the standard
factors that would influence IPO performance, as well geo-
153 See Appendix Table 1, Panel B1, B2.
154 See Appendix Table 2, Panel B1, B2.
155 All results are significant at the 1% level. See Appendix Table 2, Panel B1.
156 I note that use of the term “conflict deals” may make the analysis seem
deterministic.  I use the term for word economy in this Article, but I did not
originally approach the analysis using that frame.
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graphic location of the issuer’s counsel and the underwriters.
As in all other specifications, I look at firm level interactions, as
well as interactions involving the same individual lawyers.
Conflict deals bear a strong relationship to large opening
day price jump both at the firm level and at the level of individ-
ual lawyers.  Each conflict deal is associated with a 12.2–14.4%
increase in first-day price jump.  When isolating only the deals
for which the same individual lawyers encounter each other
repeatedly, the opening day price jump above what might be
considered the “standard” 20% is between 16.1% and 21.5%
higher on average.  This effect is consistent over the first thirty,
sixty, and ninety days that the stock trades.157
v. Analysis of Price Performance Results
The contrasts in the results between different sets of actors
are instructive.  From the regression analysis above, it appears
that frequency of interaction bears a strong positive relation-
ship to stock performance.  For each additional interaction in
the sets of parties discussed above, the marginal effect on price
performance is positive and statistically significant.  The mag-
nitude of the effect is markedly greater when an issuer’s coun-
sel is in a potential “conflict” situation, with each additional
interaction resulting in a multiple of the 15–20% level of under-
pricing reported to be the norm.  This raises the possibility of
agency costs, even while indicating that repeated interaction
leads to better deals.
A notable trend in the results is that the value of each
additional interaction decreases as the time horizon increases.
This indicates that repeated interactions that occurred longer
ago have a lower impact on the deal, all else equal.  That result
is consistent with what one would expect if repeated interaction
affects deal outcomes through familiarity, norming, and team-
work: if the chances to interact are fewer and further between,
the team dynamic will be less strong.
b. Price Correction
As previously discussed, underpricing complicates the re-
sults with respect to price performance.  Therefore, it is impor-
tant to tease apart price performance that indicates a
successful deal from price performance that indicates exces-
sive loss of value for the issuer.  Analyzing price correction
157 See Appendix Table 1, Panels D1, D2.
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provides a useful way to see whether or not interactions among
the parties also have any mitigating effects on underpricing.
Recall that price correction is the process by which the
offering price is changed from the initial offering estimate (set
out in their preliminary prospectus) to the final price (which the
initial investors pay).158  To test whether or not there is price
correction, I first construct a measure of “strong performers,”
which are stocks whose price after 30 trading days is at least
20% and 30% higher than the upper range of their filing price
range (controlling for the performance of the S&P Index during
the same thirty days).159
I look at the probability of upward price revisions for these
issues separately for IPOs where the bank and counsel, bank
and issuer’s counsel, and the two sets of counsel are frequent
collaborators, and where that is not the case.  For this analysis,
“frequent collaborators” are bank-counsel or counsel-counsel
pairs that have worked together at least three times prior to the
current IPO in the past two years.  If repeated interactions re-
sult in greater error rates, or collusion to excessively under-
price, one would expect the probability of upward price revision
to be lower when the bank and counsel are frequent
collaborators.
i. Underwriter and Underwriter’s Counsel
When the underwriter and its counsel have collaborated
frequently in the recent past, a deal is 8.7–9.3% more likely to
see correct upward price revision.160  This suggests both lower
error rates for deal pricing generally and more independence on
the part of underwriter’s counsel when there are more frequent
interactions.  This finding also further supports a conclusion
that relational dynamics between the underwriter and its coun-
sel improve the deal.  When the results are narrowed to only
those deals for which specific lawyers can be identified as
working repeatedly with underwriters, the results remain sig-
nificant, although the magnitude goes down to 4.3–4.5% more
likely to revise up.  This confirms that the effect exists in rela-
tion to individuals instead of firms or other factors.  The lower
magnitude might be explained by the fact that the effect is
weaker for individuals, or it could be a measurement error due
to the fact that only a few of the lawyers who would be doing
158 See supra Part II.B.1.a.
159 See Appendix Table 3.
160 See Appendix Table 3, Panel A1.
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deals can actually be identified, making the sample of individu-
als necessarily underinclusive.
ii. Underwriter’s Counsel and Issuer’s Counsel
I again examine the probability of correct upward price
revision, this time with respect to the two sets of counsel.161
There is a weakly significant (at the 10% level) relationship
between repeated interactions and the probability of upward
price revision when the first-day bounce is 20% or more.  No
other significant results are seen.162
iii. Underwriter and Issuer’s Counsel
With respect to frequent interactions between the issuer’s
counsel and the underwriter, the analysis reveals no significant
relationship to the probability of upward price revision for
strong performers.163  Thus there is no evidence that the is-
suer’s counsel is more likely to impact the correction of the
underpricing problem when it has encountered the same un-
derwriter across the table frequently.
I again examine the probability of correct upward price
revision for deals in which potential conflict exists to determine
if issuer’s counsel undertakes a countervailing corrective re-
sponse in such circumstances.164  Again the analysis reports
no significant relationship, which is consistent with—albeit not
determinative of—an agency problem.
c. Securities Litigation
Another potential indicator of the quality of deal outcomes
is the incidence of securities litigation ensuing from the IPO.
Securities litigation can occur for both meritorious and spuri-
ous reasons, and does not necessarily implicate the quality of
the lawyers’ representation or their relationship with their cli-
ents.165  Nonetheless, a systematic pattern of either increased
or decreased litigation provides a proxy for the quality of the
due diligence and disclosure.
161 See Appendix Table 3, Panels C1, C2.
162 Id.
163 See Appendix Table 3, Panels B1, B2.
164 See Appendix Table 3, Panels D1, D2.
165 See supra note 147.
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FIGURE 2. REPEATED COUNSEL INTERACTIONS AND INCIDENCE OF
SECURITIES LITIGATION WITHIN ONE YEAR
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Figure 2 above illustrates the striking trend with respect to
repeated interaction and securities litigation.  The graph shows
an association between a markedly higher incidence of securi-
ties class actions and the frequency of recent collaboration
between issuer’s counsel and the underwriter.  This graph is
merely descriptive of the raw data; below, I report the results of
regression analyses including factors that may affect litiga-
tion.166  As previously mentioned, in order to examine whether
repeated interaction has any impact on litigation, I use a probit
model to estimate the relationship between repeated interac-
tion and the probability that a company will have a lawsuit filed
within six months, and within one year of an IPO.167
166 As I discuss in more detail below, a body of literature has also connected
litigation to underpricing, explaining underpricing as a possible insurance and
deterrent to litigation. See, e.g., Randolph P. Beatty & Ivo Welch, Issuer Expenses
and Legal Liability in Initial Public Offerings, 39 J.L. & ECON. 545 (1996) (examin-
ing the viability of the litigation theory); Lowry & Shu, supra note 107, at 326–33 R
(finding evidence to support the litigation hypothesis); see also Spindler, supra
note 117, at 31–35 (exploring legal and empirical dimensions of the litigation R
hypothesis). But see Alexander, supra note 104, at 54–61 (providing a detailed R
critique of the litigation hypothesis).  As I will explain further below, statistical
analysis in this paper points to underpricing being a factor encouraging litigation,
as opposed to preventing it.
167 I limit the analysis to one year for two reasons.  The first is that IPO-related
class actions are typically filed within the first year after the offering. See Lowry &
Shu, supra note 107, at 315 (discussing statistics on lawsuits filed).  The second R
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-5\CRN501.txt unknown Seq: 47 30-JUN-16 15:55
2016] THE AGENCY COSTS OF TEAMWORK 1275
i. Underwriter and Underwriter’s Counsel
The regressions reveal no significant relationship between
litigation and frequent interaction between the underwriter and
its counsel within the preceding year.168  The lack of significant
result remains for deals within the past two and three years, as
well as for deals for which individual lawyer identities can be
confirmed.  The absence of a significant result is not the same
as a precise result showing no correlation.  Nonetheless, the
lack of relationship is noteworthy when compared to the re-
sults below that demonstrate a strong relationship between the
probability of litigation and other types of repeated
interactions.
ii. Issuer’s Counsel and Underwriter’s Counsel
When both sets of law firms have worked together more
frequently, the analysis shows a slightly (0.3%) lower
probability of litigation for the first six months, but no signifi-
cant result is apparent for longer periods.169  The six-month
results might suggest a further positive benefit from lawyers’
frequent interactions.  Since a primary task of the lawyers is to
limit liability, one would hope to see better working relation-
ships result in more effectively preventing litigation, notwith-
standing the fact that litigation can be caused by numerous
factors outside of lawyers’ control.
iii. Issuer’s Counsel Interactions with the
Underwriter
With respect to such deals where the potential for conflict
of interest is high, the results of the analysis are particularly
striking: when the issuer’s counsel has represented the under-
writer within the preceding year, there is a 2.9–3.5% increase
in the probability of a securities class action lawsuit within one
year of the IPO.170  Given that the baseline probability of having
reason is to remain conservative in my empirical approach.  Other studies of
securities litigation also have used a one-year window to assess whether or not
litigation is IPO related. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act?, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 598, 607 (2007)
(“Although plaintiffs’ attorneys may file suit up to 3 years after the IPO, I focus on
the first-year performance to screen out the impact of factors unrelated to the IPO
on aftermarket performance.”).  The results in this Article, however, would remain
the same even if a three-year window were used.
168 See Appendix Table 4, Panels A1, A2.
169 See Appendix Table 4, Panels C1, C2.
170 See Appendix Table 4, Panel D1.  The probability of securities class action
litigation within three years increases by 5.8% for each underwriter representa-
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a securities class action filed for all deals in the dataset is 4.4%,
the results of the analysis represent a significant increase.
When the dataset is narrowed to only deals for which individual
lawyers can be identified, the results become stronger.  The
probability of a class action within six months becomes signifi-
cant and increases 2.0–2.7%; the probability of a suit within
one year increases by 4.4–4.7%.  The finding further suggests a
negative outcome for the issuer when the issuer’s counsel has
recently represented the underwriter.  This raises the possibil-
ity of agency problems between the issuer’s counsel, the under-
writer, and the issuer.
d. Disclosure
Analysis of the prospectus disclosure provides some in-
sight into one part of the deal for which the lawyers are very
directly responsible, as previously discussed.  The content and
impact of different types of disclosure vary, but empirical work
on disclosure agrees that the risk factors have a significant
effect on how a deal is received by investors.171  I therefore
analyze the share of the prospectus for each deal devoted to
risk factors.172
i. Underwriter and Underwriter’s Counsel
The level of risk factor disclosure provides some evidence
that frequent collaboration between the underwriter and its
counsel yields better team functioning.  Each additional deal
that the two parties complete together in the preceding year is
associated with a 30.9% increase in the proportion of the pro-
spectus occupied by risk factors.  For repeated deals in the past
two years, the marginal increase is 20.0%, and for three years,
it is 15.0%.173
Although the quantity of disclosure is a rough measure of
how informative disclosure is, it yields some tentative conclu-
sions when viewed in light of the other results.  Specifically, a
tion within the past year.  The results remain after removing the IPOs from the so-
called bubble period, from 1999 to 2000, which were especially prone to litigation.
171 See, e.g., Hanley & Hohberg, supra note 117, at 2821–22 (discussing the R
relationship between the degree of disclosure and investors’ perception of the
accuracy of the prospectus).
172 In addition, I analyzed the overall length of prospectuses and the propor-
tion of each devoted to the management’s discussion and analysis section
(“MD&A”) which is also reported to be important in the marketing effort. See
Interview with W, supra note 55.  Neither prospectus length nor MD&A proportion R
bore a significant relationship to repeated interaction, and so those results are not
reported.
173 See Appendix Table 10.  Each estimate is significant at the 0.1% level
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tentative inference can be drawn that the increase in risk fac-
tors is a beneficial outcome for the underwriter, especially if it
is not associated with any great litigation risk or risk due to
underlying factors specific to the issuing company.  The in-
creased risk factor disclosure might put downward pressure on
the initial filing range or the final price, because it adds to
investor uncertainty about the issuing company.  This would,
on balance, benefit the underwriter who stands to lose less and
gain more from underpricing.
ii. Issuer’s Counsel and Underwriter’s Counsel
Repeated interactions between the two sets of counsel are
associated with a trend of marginally increasing risk factor
disclosure, similar to that seen with respect to the underwriter
and its counsel alone.  The degree by which risk factor disclo-
sure increases remains relatively constant regardless of
whether prior repeated interactions took place in the past one
year (19.0%), two years (17.3%), or three years (15.1%).174  It is
not clear from this analysis alone whether the pattern reveals
an outcome that is more favorable to the issuer or the under-
writer.  However, given the relatively modest levels of under-
pricing and negative probability of litigation associated with the
two sets of counsel’s interactions, the increase in negative dis-
closure does not seem particularly troublesome for the issuer,
and may actually indicate a good working dynamic between the
two sets of counsel.
iii. Issuer’s Counsel Interactions with the
Underwriter
With respect to issuer’s counsel that have repeatedly faced
the same underwriter across the table, repeated interactions
are associated with much more risk factor disclosure.  Each
additional deal together within the preceding one year is asso-
ciated with a 43.7% increase in the proportion of the prospec-
tus occupied by risk factors.  For repeated deals in the past two
years, the marginal increase is 34.2%, and for three years, it is
32.1%.175  An analysis of disclosure when issuer’s counsel has
recently represented the underwriter shows a striking increase
in the proportion of risk factor disclosure: an increase of
128.1% when issuer’s counsel has represented the underwriter
174 See Appendix Table 11.  Each estimate is significant at the 0.1% level.
175 See Appendix Table 12.  Each estimate is significant at the 0.1% level.
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within the past year.176  This further supports the conclusion
that, regardless of the precise reasons, the result is bad for the
issuer.
There are a few plausible interpretations of these results.
One interpretation is that the issuer’s counsel is trying to pro-
tect the issuer from litigation risk, and therefore allowing or
even insisting on high levels of risk disclosure.  However, the
result could also be a sign of high levels of deference to the
underwriter without regard to any detrimental impact on the
issuer.  As previously explained, issuers tend to resist risk fac-
tor disclosure, and one job of the issuer’s counsel is to convince
the issuer to accept language that is necessary, and to negoti-
ate with the underwriter and its counsel to exclude risk factors
that are not necessary.  Whichever interpretation is correct,
however, these results, taken together with the results from the
preceding sections, point to worse outcomes for issuers when
repeated interactions increase.  Given the negative effect that
risk factors have on underpricing, and given the apparent lack
of protection these risk factors are affording the issuers against
litigation, the increase in negative disclosure seems to be a
negative outcome for the issuing company.  And although a
large amount of risk disclosure may indicate a fundamentally
risky company, underlying company risk alone would not ex-
plain why repeated interactions among lawyers and bankers
result in incremental increases in risk disclosure over succes-
sive unrelated deals.  Nonetheless, this conclusion is at best
tentative and must be taken with caution, given the inherent
ambiguity of the risk disclosure as a measure of deal
performance.
e. Time to Completion as a Measure of Efficiency
One way to assess efficiency is by measuring the speed at
which familiar parties complete deals.  To do this, I analyze the
length of time it takes to complete a deal from the date that the
Form S-1 (or its equivalent) is filed with the SEC to the offer
date, when the issuer officially goes public.  This time period
represents only a portion of the time it takes to complete an
entire deal, because much of the work is done before the S-1 is
filed.  Nonetheless, it serves as a proxy for speed and efficiency.
Because the timing of the deal may depend on market condi-
tions in a relatively narrow stretch of time leading up to the
offering, I use a fixed effect for each quarter of the IPO year, in
176 See Appendix Table 13.  Results for share of the prospectus devoted to
MD&A were not significant and not reported.
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addition to the fixed effect for the entire year.  The data reveals
that the number of lead underwriters or joint bookrunners in
the deal has a significant impact on how long the deal takes to
complete (each additional manager increases the deal length by
approximately six days), and therefore the number of lead un-
derwriters is added to the group of controls.  I limit the analysis
to deals that are completed within one year, due to the pres-
ence of a number of lengthy deals in the dataset occurring
mainly during the time of the financial crisis in 2008.  Remov-
ing all deals that take longer than one year lowers the chances
of skewing the results or overstating the true effect of repeated
interactions.
i. Underwriter and Underwriter’s Counsel
For each repeated interaction between the underwriter and
its counsel within the past year, the time between the filing of
the S-1 and the completion of the deal goes down by almost two
days.  This means that the deals get completed, on average, at
least two days faster.  When only deals for which specific indi-
vidual lawyers can be identified are analyzed, deals are com-
pleted between three and five days faster for each prior deal in
the past year.  The results are necessarily incomplete, because
I do not observe the timeframe of the deal from the time before
the S-1 is filed, and therefore I can only analyze some of the
variation in time and efficiency.177  Nonetheless, the systematic
reduction in the length of time to completion of the S-1 pro-
vides evidence of a significant increase in efficiency related to
repeated interaction and familiarity with the individuals in-
volved.  This effect fades slightly in both magnitude and signifi-
cance for repeated interactions within two and three years.  In
general, however, the trend supports what theory would ex-
pect: that better teamwork produces faster results.
ii. Issuer’s Counsel and Underwriter’s Counsel
No significant reduction in time to completion is evident
from the data when law firms encounter each other repeatedly.
This is surprising, given that one would expect familiarity to
facilitate a more efficient process.  However, the length of time a
177 For instance, it is possible that repeated interactions slow the deal down
between the time the deal commences and the filing of the S-1; or it is possible
that repeated interactions speed the deal up by more than two days.  While the
analysis reported here does not definitively reveal which is the case, the pattern
observed in the regression models supports what lawyers and bankers report in
interviews: that repeated interactions lead to faster deals.
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deal takes may be affected by many factors outside the lawyers’
control.  The timing of the deal is usually managed by the un-
derwriters, and so perhaps it should not be surprising that
familiarity between counsel alone would not affect it.  The lack
of a significant result with respect to firm interactions may be
due to noise in the data, or it could be the case that individuals
do not interact as frequently even when the same firms en-
counter each other repeatedly.
iii. Issuer’s Counsel Interactions with the
Underwriter
The analysis reveals no significant relationship with regard
to issuer’s counsel’s prior representations and the length of
time to market at the firm level.178  When individual lawyers
are analyzed, there is a notable reduction in time to comple-
tion.  This effect exists, however, only for deals that drag on
longer than one year between the S-1 filing and the offering
date—an extremely long time period for an IPO.  When deals
that take less than one year are examined, the effect disap-
pears.  It is not clear why this would be the case—it could be
increased efficiency, or could be something specific about the
nature of deals that take an unusually long time.  It is therefore
difficult to draw conclusions from this result.
2. Causation Analysis
It would be dangerous to conclude from naı¨ve regressions
alone that a causal relationship exists between repeated inter-
actions and the various outcome variables analyzed.  It could
be the case, for instance, that some other underlying factor is
driving the results as well as the observed repeated interac-
tions.  Before proceeding to analyze the implications of the find-
ings above, further analysis of identification and alternative
interpretations of the results are warranted.
An inference of causation with respect to the results above
would need to rely on the ability to treat the identities of the
issuer’s counsel and underwriters in each particular deal as
quasi-random.  This does not suggest that the dealmakers
need be completely randomly chosen (which would, of course,
be unrealistic).  But the inference assumes that repeated ob-
servations of lawyers and underwriters working together (or
across the table from one another) are not the result of the
same factors that drive the outcomes being measured, and
178 See Appendix Table 5, Panel D1.
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thus the incidence of dealmakers encountering each other re-
peatedly are random with respect to the outcomes.
In this regard, one might be very worried about the possi-
bility of selection driving the results.  However, there are com-
pelling reasons to rule out selection here.  The first is that the
underwriter does not choose the issuer’s counsel or vice versa.
Although there are reports of instances in which the issuer’s
counsel helps to select the underwriter, the practice is not
widespread in IPOs.  In many cases, the issuer’s IPO counsel is
chosen at around the same time or after the underwriter is
chosen.  If the issuer’s counsel does help choose the under-
writer, it is from a short list already determined by the issuer’s
management, and so counsel has a limited role in influencing
the decision.
It is important to note that, although the underwriter does
not choose the issuer’s counsel, there are instances in which
the issuer’s management asks the underwriter for suggestions.
In such instances, by all accounts, the underwriters provide a
list for the issuer’s management to choose from.  Such cases
reportedly happen in a minority of deals.  And while creating a
short list may give the underwriter some influence over the
selection of counsel, the underwriter still does not ultimately
control the identity of the issuer’s counsel.
There may, of course, be other parties or factors at work
determining both the identity of the issuer’s counsel and the
IPO outcomes analyzed above that could be problematic for
treating the variation in the identity of the deal team as plausi-
bly random.  In addition to the lead underwriter, venture capi-
tal investors are another set of actors who are reportedly
influential in the selection of counsel in some IPOs.  Venture
capitalists typically invest in new companies, and sometimes
provide advice to company management on matters including
the selection of counsel.  To control for the possibility that ven-
ture capital involvement might be driving the results, I create a
dummy variable to distinguish IPOs in which venture capital-
ists are involved and ones one where they are not.  If venture
capitalists are a source of selection, the results should disap-
pear when this variable is introduced, but the results remain.  I
also control the age of each IPO firm, using the natural log of
company ages, to account for the fact that many venture-
backed firms are relatively younger companies.
Law firm experience and reputation are also possible to
confound for several reasons.  It could be the case that firm
experience would give rise to the same types of results seen
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above, and that one would expect to see with good team dy-
namics.  It could also be the case that firm reputation drives
the results through a signaling mechanism, conveying quality
or lack thereof to the market or to potential litigants.  Reputa-
tion, experience, and prior relationships with clients may also
cut against the premise of quasi-random assignment.  Inter-
views suggest that issuers’ and underwriters’ choice of law firm
is often based on either a previous relationship or recent expe-
rience doing IPOs in a given industry.179
With respect to law firm recent experience and reputation, I
employ several strategies to rule these out as confounding fac-
tors.  In order to rule out the possibility that law firm quality or
experience is driving the results, I construct variables to re-
present the number of deals each firm has done in the previous
one year, two years, and three years in each industry, and
overall.  When these variables are added to the model, they do
not change the results at all.  As a further test of robustness, I
perform the same test but use law firm market share in the
previous year as a measure of experience and reputation.  This
variable similarly does not change the results.  In addition, I
add fixed effects for certain law firms that appear most fre-
quently in the dataset, and the results remain.180  I perform
similar checks with respect to underwriters, using variables to
account for underwriter experience and market share.  Again,
the results remain.
Trends related to the issuing company’s industry, its size,
and the time period in which the IPO took place might all factor
into the same issuer’s counsel and underwriter encountering
each other in multiple deals in a given time period.181  At the
same time, these factors could influence the outcomes being
studied here without regard to the effect of repeated interac-
tion.  I employ a number of strategies to rule out the impact of
these factors as drivers of the results.  The most basic strate-
gies for doing this, as already described, are the use of fixed
effects for year and industry, and the interaction of the two.182
179 See Interview with W, supra note 55. R
180 In particular, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati appears a disproportional-
ity high number of times on the dataset.  Adding a fixed effect for Wilson Sonsini
does not change the results. See Appendix Tables 7 and 8.
181 See Interview with W, supra note 55; see also Barondes et al., supra note R
27, at 184–85. R
182 The interaction of the year and industry acts as a fixed effect for all deals in
a particular industry in a given year.  For example, if all technology IPOs in 1999
suffered from a very high level of underpricing, the interaction of the industry and
year fixed effects will control for that trend.
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In addition to the basic approach, in alternative specifications I
use fixed effects for each lead underwriter and the quarter of
the year in which an IPO occurs.  Both of those variables inter-
acted with the industry of the issuing company.  In addition, I
use controls for geographic location of the law firms, the fees
charged by each law firm for each deal, the interaction of loca-
tion and industry of the issuer, and the existence or absence of
outside financing (from venture capital or other sources).  I also
include controls for the portion of the IPO proceeds that go to
insiders, and the portion that go to company itself.
With respect to prior relationships between the banks and
the law firms, I construct proxies for bank-lawyer relation-
ships, and remove observations that result from these prior
relationships.  I do this in two ways.  First, I remove observa-
tions for lawyers and banks that are anecdotally reported to
have strong prior relationships.  Second, I remove observations
for bank-lawyer pairs with the most frequent interactions as
determined by the data.  In both cases, the results remain.
Moreover, I account for anomalous time periods in the dataset.
The years 1999 and 2000 have especially high numbers of IPOs
(as well as repeated interactions) and are associated with very
high levels of underpricing and litigation.  I use fixed effects for
these years to remove their average impact on the outcomes,
and in alternative specifications I remove all deals done in each
of these years from the data set completely.183  In each case,
the analysis yields results consistent with my preferred
specification.
Other factors that might impact the issuer’s choice of
counsel as well as the outcome variables are the quality of the
issuing company and the sophistication of the issuing com-
pany’s management.  Factors that serve as proxies for quality
and sophistication are the age of the company (which impacts
the amount of information available about the company), the
value of the company in terms of total assets, the value of the
company as determined by book value per share, and the size
of the underwriting syndicate.184  Including these factors in the
model yields results consistent with those in the preferred
specification.185
Furthermore, the systematic incremental nature of the re-
sults makes it unlikely that underlying factors are driving the
183 See Appendix Tables 7 and 8.
184 Deal size, measured by the log of gross proceeds, is a standard control in
all specifications. See HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE FINANCE, supra note 13, at 263–80. R
185 See Appendix Tables 7 and 8.
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selection of counsel as well as the outcomes of interest once
time period, market conditions, and industry are controlled for.
In order for underlying factors to be driving the selection of
counsel as well as the results, it would have to be true that the
lawyers are being selected based on very accurate predictions
of the future levels of, say, underpricing and litigation, and that
such levels were being used to select counsel based on the
precise number of times a bank had worked with them (or
across the table from them) a specific number of times.  For
example, it would have to be true, on average, that Credit
Suisse predicts 40% underpricing and so picks a law firm it has
worked with exactly three times in the past year; but a 60%
predicted level of underpricing would require it to pick a differ-
ent law firm that it had worked with exactly four times in the
past year.  That scenario is not only extremely unlikely as a
matter of intuition, it contradicts the accounts of bankers and
lawyers describing how the selection of counsel works.
In sum, the results rely on very reasonable assumptions
and are extremely robust to numerous tests, adding controls
and cutting the data to remove observations that could be the
result of selection.  The remaining data is the result of plausibly
random variation, and support an inference of causation.
B. Practitioner Experience and Team Dynamics
The practitioner accounts gathered for this Article provide
valuable context for the quantitative results above.  While the
lawyers do not see a direct connection between what they do
and the quantitative outcomes of the deals (and are generally
surprised that there is any correlation), their experiences point
to a similar pattern of contrasts between positive and poten-
tially negative consequences of team interaction in IPOs.
Lawyers who work on IPOs report that they regularly come
across familiar counsel and underwriters on different deals.186
Their experiences illustrate how frequent interactions can fos-
ter better deal outcomes by building mutual understanding,
186 This impression is confirmed by the quantitative data.  Between 1996 and
2010, the same law firm and lead underwriter(s) worked across the table from one
another multiple times in the same year on 450 occasions, out of 2,265 total
deals.  Between 1996 and 2010, there were 406 instances in which issuer’s coun-
sel had acted as underwriter’s counsel for the same underwriter within the previ-
ous year.  On 206 of those occasions, the issuer’s counsel had also worked across
the table from lead underwriter more than one time in the past year, out of a total
of 2,265 deals.  Between 1996 and 2010, 454 IPO deals featured law firms that
had worked across the table from one another in an IPO deal at least three times
within the preceding two years.
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coordination, and trust.187  Lawyers frequently report the expe-
rience of working on an IPO as one in which all members of the
deal team feel that they are working toward a common goal, an
important primary condition for effective team dynamics.188
Lawyers report that when they are working with an institu-
tional client they have worked with before, the process runs
more smoothly.189  The lawyers understand the organization
and how it operates,190 the key personnel concerned with vari-
ous issues,191 communication norms,192 and both institutional
and individual preferences with regard to the deal.193  For ex-
ample, one in-house lawyer taking his company public re-
counts that during negotiations, the underwriter’s counsel
with whom the underwriter had worked frequently regularly
expressed confidence about what his client would or would not
agree to, without any need to confer with anyone from the
bank’s team.194  This sort of understanding leads in turn to
better coordination, and better alignment of agents and princi-
pals in the performance of their tasks.  The lawyer needs less
time to gather information about the client’s interests and can
negotiate on the client’s behalf more effectively.
In addition, assuming previous deals have gone well, more
familiarity creates more trust in what the lawyers are doing.195
This in turn frees the bank personnel to focus on marketing
and other commercial aspects of the deal.  In some instances,
lawyers are reportedly so familiar with the client and the trans-
actions they do that they become involved in business strategy,
counseling their clients on decisions for which investment
bankers typically do not seek a lawyer’s advice.196
The lawyers interviewed see less downside to teamwork,
although they acknowledged the possibility of too much trust
or deference to the underwriter.  As one lawyer described, when
drafting the prospectus as issuer’s counsel, it is common to
187 See Interview with K, supra note 86. R
188 See Hackman, supra note 22, at 249–50. R
189 There was a consensus among lawyers’ interviews that this was the case.
See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Attorney (L) (name withheld by request) (Nov.
10, 2013) (on file with author) [hereinafter Interview with L].
190 Interview with D, supra note 39. R
191 See id.
192 Interview with F, supra note 115. R
193 Id. As one lawyer in a large capital markets practice described, “I know
exactly who to e-mail or call if I need something, or who to prod if something needs
to get done.”  Interview with K, supra note 86. R
194 Interview with L, supra note 189. R
195 Interview with D, supra note 39. R
196 Id.
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afford the underwriter great weight in driving much of the con-
tent of the disclosure, identifying the precedents to use, and
often reigning in what issuers want to say about themselves.197
Too much deference can undermine the issuer’s interests,
even if their desires are justified.  For example, according to
one anecdote, in the course of a drafting session, a negotiation
commenced over the inclusion of a disclosure that issuer did
not want to include.198  Having no particular expertise, the
issuer’s management deferred to counsel.199  The issuer’s
counsel argued for its exclusion because it was not material
but might nonetheless provide an unnecessary roadmap to liti-
gation.200  The underwriter and its counsel were insistent, and
the issuer’s lawyer conceded the point.201  This example illus-
trates how issuer’s counsel may be reluctant to disrupt the
good working relationship of the group, even if it might be bad
for the client’s long-term interests.
One lawyer described a particularly unpleasant deal
marked by poor teamwork.  In that deal, the lawyers represent-
ing the issuer had not done many IPOs, and were in fact typi-
cally M&A lawyers, and took what was described as a more
adversarial stance.  The interviewee recounted how the lawyers
refused to “reign in” the issuer’s management on certain re-
quests, turned everything into a laborious negotiation, and
blamed the delays on the underwriter’s counsel.202  Despite the
lack of teamwork, the issuer was able to get more of what it
wanted than would typically be the case.
IV
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
The findings above indicate that teamwork is a double-
edged sword.  The frequency of principal-agent interactions
plays a significant role in augmenting the quality of an IPO
deal; however, there is also evidence that repeated interaction
between lawyers and underwriting investment banks magnifies
agency costs between the issuer and the underwriter, as well as
the issuer and its own counsel.
197 Interview with L, supra note 189. R
198 Telephone Interview with Attorney (C) (name withheld by request) (June 21,
2013) (on file with author) [hereinafter Interview with C].
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Interview with W, supra note 55. R
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Though the data support the general conclusion about the
benefits and pitfalls of teamwork, they do not reveal the precise
mechanism.  The most plausible mechanism would be indirect.
Legal counsel influence deals through their advice and their
impact on disclosure, but they typically do not engage directly
in negotiations related to pricing and other commercial aspects
of the deal.  On the positive side, this means that good group
dynamics can increase the ability of every member of the group
to perform tasks more effectively.  For example, if counsel
works well with the underwriters, they can focus less on regu-
latory matters and spend more time on marketing and other
commercial aspects of the transaction.  If the lawyers do a bet-
ter job writing disclosure, it helps investors to understand the
company, generating more interest and making it easier for the
investment banks to sell the issuer’s shares.
Nonetheless, the most plausible mechanism for the results
above also implicates the tension between the lawyer’s agency
role and the group dynamic of the deals.  The components of
this mechanism range from the benign to the pernicious.  On
the more benign end of the spectrum, it could be the case that a
better team dynamic entrenches a common idea about the na-
ture of the team’s goals in an IPO, such that it conceals the
ways in which the parties’ interests diverge.  This can be de-
scribed as the common knowledge effect: a feature of group
dynamics in which information and ideas held by the most
group members (the things that “everybody knows”) have dis-
proportionate influence on group judgments to the exclusion of
new information.203  The entrenched goals and norms are de-
veloped through repeated interactions over time until alterna-
tives seem outlandish.
Moreover, the perceived goals of the deal, as well as the
group ideas about the optimal outcome of the deal, are driven
by the underwriters—the repeat actors with the most at stake
in shaping those goals.204  After numerous interactions, the
goals of the transaction as expressed by the underwriting bank
come to be taken for granted by the issuer’s counsel and un-
derwriter’s counsel alike, and they in turn convince the issuers
accordingly.  In such situations, it is often difficult for a rela-
tively new member of a group, such as the issuer’s manage-
ment, to express dissent.  The issuer in an IPO may not see the
203 See Daniel Gigone & Reid Hastie, The Common Knowledge Effect: Informa-
tion Sharing and Group Judgment, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 959, 959–74
(1993).
204 Cf. SUNSTEIN & HASTIE, supra note 83, at 15. R
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utility of fighting what the rest of the group sees as market
norms, and counsel are unable to advise them otherwise.205
An even more pernicious possibility is that the issuer’s counsel
is overly solicitous of the underwriter’s preferences and per-
spective on how the deal should run, in the hope of currying
favor and future business.206  If the issuer’s management is not
experienced in capital markets work, they rely heavily on their
lawyers both for advice and as examples of how to interact with
underwriters, how to negotiate, and how much deference to
afford to the underwriters’ expertise.  In many instances,
outside funders such as venture capital groups may be in-
volved in some of the deal negotiations.  Although the data do
not reveal any significant differences in the patterns when
outside funders are present in a deal, it is possible they might
also influence any negotiations with underwriters.  Nonethe-
less, they are also subject to the common knowledge effect, and
more importantly, their interests are also often not perfectly
aligned with the long-term interests of the issuers.  For exam-
ple, outside funders are typically subject to lockup provisions,
and therefore they usually cannot sell their stake until several
months after the IPO.207  This means, however, that they stand
to benefit from underpricing as well, but may have less of a
long-term stake in the company once the lockup agreements
expire.208  Nonetheless, the managers of a small venture-
backed firm are unlikely to challenge their outside backers,
especially if all the other parties in the deal are giving similar
advice in lockstep.
Agency costs could arise in one or a combination of these
scenarios in a deal team.  Whichever of these possibilities ex-
plain the precise dynamics at work, the overall conclusion re-
mains that agency costs arise in teamwork, and indeed agency
205 The social psychology literature notes that majorities tend to silence mi-
nority opinions, especially opinions from a party not previously part of the group,
because minorities do not want to lose the favor of the majority. See Robert S.
Baron et al., Social Corroboration and Opinion Extremity, 32 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 537, 557–59 (1996).  This may explain why the managers of issuing
companies concede to underpricing so pliantly.
206 This is also analogous to regulatory capture, or what some scholars refer to
as “deep capture.” See Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduc-
tion to the Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep
Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 202–06 (2003).
207 See Interview with W, supra note 55. R
208 See Griffith, supra note 17, at 622.  This was an issue in the eToys case as R
well.  When the lockups expired several months after the IPO, venture capital
investors dumped their stock in order to realize their profit.  This resulted in the
price of the stock dropping. See Laura Casares Field & Gordon Hanka, The
Expiration of IPO Share Lockups, 56 J. FIN. 471, 474 (2001).
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costs are exacerbated by the same kinds of group interaction
that are thought to produce better teamwork.  These agency
costs arise along three dimensions: the relationship between
the issuing company and the underwriters, the relationship
between the issuing company and its counsel, and the relation-
ship between the issuing company’s management and the com-
pany itself as an entity.209  Below, I describe how the law
surrounding each of these relationships is impacted.210
A. “Arm’s Length” Transactions and Team Dynamics
If teamwork enhances agency costs between the issuer and
the underwriter, as well as the issuer and its counsel, then
many capital markets transactions are less “arm’s length” than
courts have previously assumed.  This is important because in
recent years, courts have increasingly been asked to decide
whether underwriters have any fiduciary duty to issuers when
it comes to getting the best price for securities in the market.211
Fiduciary relationships exist to minimize agency costs
while preserving the benefits of agency.212  They do so by im-
posing on an agent “a duty to act for or to give advice for the
benefit of another upon matters within the scope of the rela-
tion.”213  In arm’s length dealings, by contrast, the law
presumes that parties to a transaction are capable of looking
after their own interests, and (absent outright fraud) are not
entitled to rely on the trustworthiness of their counterparts.
209 A number of the lawyers interviewed noted that the issuing company is the
ultimate client. See, e.g., Interview with W, supra note 55. R
210 I note that the law’s treatment of each of these relationships could be
explored in great depth.  However, in order to maintain the focus of this paper, I
will describe them in relatively broad terms and save deeper analysis for future
work.
211 See, e.g., Xpedior Creditor Tr. v. Credit Suisse First Bos. (USA) Inc., 399 F.
Supp. 2d 375, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Breakaway Solutions, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley
& Co., No. Civ.A. 19522-NC, 2005 WL 3488497, at *2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 8, 2005) (“To
the extent that underwriters function, among other things, as expert advisors to
their clients on market conditions, a fiduciary duty may exist.”); Jorling v. An-
them, Inc., 836 F. Supp. 2d 821, 834–35 (S.D. Ind. 2011) (finding no fiduciary
duty between an underwriter and issuer with respect to advice on size and price of
an IPO); EBC I, Inc. v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 936 N.Y.S.2d 92, 96–97 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2011) (finding that no fiduciary duty arose between an underwriter and
issuer); HF Mgmt. Servs. LLC v. Pistone, 818 N.Y.S.2d 40, 42 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006)
(“New York . . . does not recognize the existence of a fiduciary obligation that is
based solely on the relationship between an underwriter and issuer.”).  For an
analysis of investment bank fiduciary duties, primarily in the context of merger
and acquisition transactions, see generally Andrew Tuch, Investment Banks as
Fiduciaries: Implications for Conflicts of Interest, 29 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 478,
478–517 (2005).
212 See SITKOFF, supra note 67, at 198–99. R
213 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
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The existence of a fiduciary duty matters legally as well as
practically, because parties will negotiate differently if they be-
lieve the other side has their best interests in mind than they
will if they believe the other side to be adverse.
While courts recognize that underwriters have interests
that are clearly adverse to the issuer’s,214 they also recognize
that the underwriter acts in an advisory capacity to the is-
suer,215 and therefore a fiduciary duty may arise—even when it
is disclaimed by contract—if the course of dealing between the
parties suggests a relationship of trust and reliance.216  De-
spite the theoretical possibility, courts addressing the issue
have typically declined to find that a fiduciary duty exists be-
tween underwriters and issuers with respect to pricing an
IPO.217
In determining whether such a relationship exists between
issuers and underwriters,218 courts have assumed that: (1) is-
suers are sophisticated parties219 who are (2) advised by exper-
ienced counsel,220 and (3) should be able to recognize when a
214 See, e.g., HF Mgmt. Servs., 818 N.Y.S.2d at 43 (“In fact, not only is a
fiduciary aspect absent from the majority of underwriting relationships, such
relationships are better characterized as adversarial since the statutorily-imposed
duty of underwriters is to investors.”).
215 See, e.g., Xpedior Creditor Trust, 399 F. Supp. 2d at 382 (“[A]n advisor and
underwriter to [the issuer] had a fiduciary duty ‘to refrain from doing any act
injurious to [the issuer], or which would deprive [the issuer] of any profit or
advantage.’”); see also EBC I, Inc., v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 832 N.E.2d 26, 32
(N.Y. 2005) (“We stress . . . that the fiduciary duty we recognize is limited to the
underwriter’s role as advisor.”).
216 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 cmt. b (“[L]iability is not depen-
dent solely upon an agreement or contractual relation between the fiduciary and
the beneficiary but results from the relation.”); see also EBC I, Inc., 832 N.E.2d at
31 (finding that an issuer’s reliance on the advice and expertise of its underwriter
could create a relationship of “higher trust” and result in the underwriter having a
fiduciary obligation to the issuer); Greene v. Greene, 47 N.Y.2d 447 (N.Y. 1979).
217 See, e.g., EBC I, Inc. v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 936 N.Y.S.2d 92, 96–97
(N.Y. App. Div. 2011); HF Mgmt. Servs., 818 N.Y.S.2d at 43.
218 See, e.g., EBC I, Inc., 832 N.E.2d at 31–32 (finding that a fiduciary relation-
ship can arise).  The precise legal issue with which courts grapple in these cases is
whether or not the plaintiffs present issues of fact sufficient to survive summary
judgment regarding the establishment of a fiduciary duty; the determination
turns upon whether the circumstances of an underwriting relationship between
sophisticated parties with experienced counsel can, in any circumstances, create
such a relationship. See, e.g., id.  For the sake of clarity, I do not discuss in detail
the legal posture of these cases, which is unnecessary to the basic point.
219 See, e.g., id. at 35–36 (Read, J., dissenting in part) (arguing that no set of
facts can establish a fiduciary relationship when the issuer is a “sophisticated,
well-counseled business entity”).
220 See id. at 36 (noting that the offering price was “negotiated by sophisti-
cated, represented parties”); HF Mgmt. Servs., 818 N.Y.S.2d at 43 (“Both parties
were separately counseled.  In fact, the underwriting agreement specifically iden-
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deal is adversarial and when it is not.221  Each of these as-
sumptions appears less compelling in light of the data on IPOs
for the reasons that follow.
1. Issuer Sophistication
Courts that declare issuers to be sophisticated commercial
entities are certainly correct, but they overlook the fact that
people can be sophisticated with respect to one area of com-
mercial life but nonetheless be susceptible to the influence of
advisors in the right context.  Managers of companies going
public often have little experience in capital markets transac-
tions, and although they may be sophisticated with respect to
business, they rely heavily on the underwriter, legal counsel,
and outside funders if there are any, to inform them of the
norms and “market” practices, and guide them through the
process.222  While this can happen outside of group or team
dealmaking, a group dynamic in which everyone appears to be
working toward the issuer’s interests can make it more difficult
for a company’s management to realize that their interests may
be adverse from those of underwriters.  And, in any event, even
sophisticated parties can succumb to groupthink or be per-
suaded by the dictates of purported “market standards.”223
When dealing with a cohesive team of advisors, all of whom the
tified EBG as the ‘special regulatory counsel for the underwriters’ and acknowl-
edged that another law firm was serving as outside counsel for WellCare.”).
221 See, e.g., EBC I, Inc., 832 N.E.2d at 36 (comparing the issuer and the
underwriter to a buyer and seller, and noting that “the [arm’s length] nature of the
contractual relationship between an issuer and an underwriter is long-estab-
lished and well-understood”); HF Mgmt. Servs., 818 N.Y.S.2d at 43 (noting the
“long-established and well-understood” nature of the relationship between under-
writer and issuer (quoting EBC I, Inc., 832 N.E.2d at 36)).
222 See Interview with W, supra note 55; see also Schneider et al., supra note R
24, at 2 (discussing the importance of counsel and investment banks in advising R
the issuer).  Issuers are also sometimes advised by venture capital firms that back
them and who can provide greater levels of sophistication.  However, the venture
capitalists who back issuing companies vary in terms of the degree of involvement
they take.  Often, they invest in numerous companies and do not get heavily
involved in the IPO itself. See Interview with W, supra note 55.  The venture R
capital investors also have interests that are aligned in many ways with the
underwriters, because they are usually subject to lock-up agreements limiting
their ability to sell shares for several months after the offering, meaning that they
will personally benefit from any underpricing when they exit the company. See
Jan Jindra & Dima Leshchinskii, Venture Capital Valuation, Partial Adjustment,
and Underpricing: Behavioral Bias or Information Production?, 50 FIN. REV. 173,
186–87 (2015).
223 See JANIS, supra note 82, at 7–9 (2d ed. 1982) (describing the theory that R
groups converge on common ideas that are not always correct); see also Heath &
Gonzales, supra note 82, at 305–26 (discussing evidence of poor decision making R
based on group dynamics).
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issuer presumes to be working in its interests, the lack of is-
suer sophistication is an even greater liability because manag-
ers will be less likely to oppose the group majority’s views
without reliable advice to back them up.224
2. Advice of Counsel
Both the theory and evidence discussed in preceding sec-
tions suggest that issuers cannot always rely on their counsel
to advocate forcefully for them or even recognize that such an
adversarial posture is appropriate when dealmaking takes on a
team-like dynamic.  The pattern seen in the quantitative re-
sults gives ample reason to doubt that the presence of sophisti-
cated counsel warrants the assumptions that issuers are
always apprised of the extent to which its interests diverge from
those of the underwriter supposedly in its service.  Given the
nature of a team-like IPO deal process, this could happen for a
number of reasons.  The issuer’s counsel can succumb to
groupthink as easily as any party, especially if the particular
lawyers involved have worked with certain members of the
group repeatedly in the past.225  The issuer’s lawyers may not
notice that the issuer’s and underwriter’s interests are adverse;
or even if the lawyers do notice, they may be reluctant to take
actions that might disrupt the smooth group dynamic.  More
subtly, counsel may establish patterns of deference to under-
writers in order to aid the team dynamic that also have the
effect of minimizing dissent.  In any scenario, a well-working
group dynamic among the issuer’s advisors can backfire on the
issuer and undermines the assumption that “counseled” par-
ties can be characterized as dealing at arm’s length.
3. Recognizing Adverse Interests
The adversarial nature of the parties’ interest in an IPO is
less clear than courts assume, given the team-like framework
and presumption of a common goal.  The terms of the under-
writers’ compensation structure—a percentage of the proceeds
of the offering—contribute to the impression that incentives are
aligned, because at a surface level, it appears that the under-
writer would want to maximize proceeds as well.226  However,
parties familiar with institutional details of IPOs might recog-
224 See Baron et al., supra note 205, at 63. R
225 Cf. SUNSTEIN & HASTIE, supra note 83, at 15. R
226 The eToys case raised this point. See EBC I. Inc., 832 N.E.2d 26 at 32
(“Thus eToys allegedly believed its interests and those of Goldman Sachs were
aligned: the higher the price, the higher Goldman Sachs’ 7% profit.”).
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nize how incentives diverge, but as just discussed, groupthink,
lack of awareness, and lack of incentive make it difficult for
issuer’s counsel to advise the issuers properly on these mat-
ters.  And if issuer’s counsel cannot or will not effectively dis-
tinguish the adversarial from nonadversarial elements of an
IPO, then the less-experienced issuer has little hope of doing so
in most cases.
4. A Fiduciary Duty for the Underwriter?
Courts that have wrestled with the fiduciary duty question
may reconsider their views in light of the pattern described
above.  The eToys case provides an illustration.  Before the
eToys case eventually settled in 2013, a divided appellate divi-
sion panel ruled that Goldman owed no fiduciary duty to eToys
in the underwriting process, and therefore had no obligation to
help it capture all of the value from the deal that it could
have.227  The majority reasoned that, despite the advisory role
an investment bank takes with respect to a company going
public, eToys and Goldman were operating at arm’s length per
the terms of the underwriting agreement between the two
parties.228
The majority noted in passing that eToys’ counsel had been
contemporaneously representing Goldman on another deal
when the eToys IPO began, but dismissed the possibility that
the prior representation would lead to any conflict, noting that
eToys’ firm (the Venture Law Group, or VLG) had properly dis-
closed the fact and obtained the parties’ consent.229  While
there is no question that the VLG properly waived any potential
conflict,230 the results above indicate that even with proper
waivers, VLG was less likely than other law firms to be in the
best position to help eToys reach independent judgments and
ask the right questions about the advice it was getting from its
underwriter.  In a deal framework that resembles a team dy-
namic where reliance and trust arise naturally, the issuer was
less likely to perceive where its interests diverged from the goal
that the group was pursuing.  And the nature of VLG’s past
interactions with Goldman made it highly unlikely that the firm
would be able to assist eToys in getting the best deal.  In all
227 See EBC I, Inc. v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 936 N.Y.S.2d 92, 100–01 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2011).
228 See id. at 94–95.
229 See id.
230 The firm had disclosed and obtained consent from the parties to engage in
the representation, per the rules of professional responsibility. See id.
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likelihood, the prevailing social dynamic left the issuer open to
exploitation, even as it assumed that other members of the deal
team were looking out for its interests.
While the results above shed light on how much a “well-
counseled” issuer can be expected to adequately protect its
interests in an IPO, they do not make clear what the solution to
problems should be.  The SEC has recognized that conflicts of
interest exist in issuer-underwriter relationships, particularly
where underwriters are engaged in spinning.  Spinning is a
practice that underwriters employed to curry favor with the
managers of issuing companies whose IPOs were severely un-
derpriced, by allowing them to invest in other “hot” or under-
priced IPOs.  If an underwriter underpriced an IPO and the
CEO or other officers of the company became upset, the under-
writer would allocate shares of the next underpriced deal, en-
suring that the shares would increase in value and make
company officers an instant profit.  The SEC, via FINRA,
banned the practice in 2011 after a string of complaints.231
Nonetheless, the conflict of interest at the heart of the spinning
problem still exists, raising questions about the duties that
underwriters owe to issuers in IPOs.
The courts that have addressed this issue have been reluc-
tant to impose any sort of duty, despite recognizing that one
might exist.232  Ultimately, whether such a duty makes sense
and how it might work raises numerous questions, adequate
discussion of which is beyond the scope of this Article.  A cate-
gorical fiduciary duty (imposed on all underwriting relation-
ships) would change the nature of underwriting dramatically
and would contravene the issuer’s and underwriter’s ability to
structure their contractual relationships.  However, an ad-hoc
finding of a fiduciary relationship in some cases, as has been
suggested by some courts,233 would make it difficult for parties
to predictably structure their relationships, and likely subject
underwriters to increased contracting costs and litigation.234
These are problems with no simple solutions, and would bene-
fit from further research.
231 See FINRA, RULE 5131 (2011).
232 See, e.g., EBC I, Inc., 936 N.Y.S.2d at 100–01 (refusing to find that the facts
sufficiently established the existence of a fiduciary duty, despite the Court of
Appeals’ insistence that one did).
233 See id.
234 See SITKOFF, supra note 67, at 200 (discussing the problems inherent in R
different types of fiduciary duty regimes).
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B. Implications for Ethical Rules
When a lawyer’s role as agent comes into tension with a
lawyer’s role as a team member, what implications are there for
lawyers’ ethical rules?  Latent conflicts, some of which may not
even enter counsel’s awareness, can exist with regard to his or
her individual clients (the issuing company’s management) as
well as the organizational client (the issuing company itself).
The results previously discussed suggest reexamining the as-
sumptions embodied in the rules about how conflicts are
handled.
1. Conflicts of Interest
Every state has passed an analogue to the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct containing provisions governing
conflicts of interest in representation.  Rule 1.7 of the Model
Rules, which principally governs such conflicts, states that a
lawyer may represent a client if the lawyer has no concurrent
conflict of interest.235  A concurrent conflict of interest is de-
fined as one in which representing the interests of one client
“will be directly adverse to another client” or “there is a signifi-
cant risk that the representation of one [client] . . . will be
materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another
client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest
of the lawyer.”236  Such conflicts, if they exist, are imputed to
the lawyer’s entire firm.237  Of course, potential conflicts arise
all the time among law firms in most major financial centers.
These are typically waived, often prospectively and in a general
manner, as part of a client’s standard retainer agreement.238
The Rules allow for lawyers to obtain a client’s informed con-
sent to continue the representation despite a potential conflict,
provided that the lawyer reasonably believes he or she will be
235 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
236 Id. r. 1.7(a).  The Rule contains slight variations in some states.  Most
notably for this Article, New York’s version provides that a conflict exists in a
concurrent representation if a “reasonable lawyer would conclude that either: (1)
the representation will involve the lawyer in representing differing interests; or (2)
there is a significant risk that the lawyer’s professional judgment on behalf of a
client will be adversely affected by the lawyer’s own financial, business, property
or other personal interests.” N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a) (N.Y. CTY. LAW.
ASS’N ETHICS INST. 2011).
237 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7, cmt. 1.
238 See Michael J. DiLernia, Advance Waivers of Conflicts of Interest in Large
Law Firm Practice, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 97, 97 (2009) (“Advance waivers of
conflicts of interest have become an essential business and ethics practice for
large law firms in the United States.”).
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able to provide competent and diligent representation.239  In
addition, to raise an ethical red flag, multiple adverse represen-
tations must provide more than the mere possibility of harm to
one client—the harm must be foreseeable and likely.240  In
short, in most jurisdictions, the rules governing conflicts of
interest are fairly permissive as long as counsel obtains in-
formed consent.  However, in some states—like New York,
where a large share of capital markets deals are conducted—
lawyers are generally prohibited from placing themselves in a
position in which they advance, or even appear to advance,
interests of a party adverse to those of their client.241
The agency tensions inherent in team-like deals challenge
the ways in which Rule 1.7 has been interpreted to allow client
consent for potential conflicts of interest.  First, the idea that a
lawyer can “reasonably believe” that adequate representation of
an issuer is possible when the counsel is currently or has re-
cently represented the same underwriter in the deal is highly
suspect.  A lawyer’s ability reasonably to assess his or her sus-
ceptibility to bias is inherently suspect.  Like most human be-
ings, lawyers can fall prey to overconfidence bias,242 and
239 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(b).  The rule states that a lawyer may
represent a client despite a concurrent conflict of interest if:
“(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to
provide competent and diligent representation to each affected
client;
(2) the representation is not prohibited by law;
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by
one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the
same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; and
(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in
writing.”
See id.
240 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7, cmt. 8 (stating that “[t]he mere
possibility of subsequent harm” will not establish a concurrent conflict of
interest).
241 See N.Y. CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, DR 5-105; see also Greene v.
Greene, 47 N.Y.2d 447, 451 (N.Y. 1979) (“Thus, attorneys historically have been
strictly forbidden from placing themselves in a position where they must advance,
or even appear to advance, conflicting interests . . . .  This prohibition was de-
signed to safeguard against not only violation of the duty of loyalty owed the
client, but also against abuse of the adversary system and resulting harm to the
public at large.” (citations omitted)).
242 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(b).  A large literature has docu-
mented overconfidence bias—or a belief in abilities beyond what one realistically
possesses—in business and finance. See ROBERT J.  SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBER-
ANCE 142 (2000) (“[S]ome basic tendency toward overconfidence appears to be a
robust human character trait . . . .”); see also Donald C. Langevoort, The Episte-
mology of Corporate-Securities Lawyering: Beliefs, Biases and Organizational Be-
havior, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 629, 650 (1997) (“Probably far more lawyers pride
themselves on independence and good judgment than consistently exhibit it.”).
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overestimate their ability to represent a party faithfully while
representing an adverse client.243  Research on lawyer recusals
supports the intuition that it is exceedingly rare for lawyers to
inform clients that they are unable to waive a conflict.244
In addition, lawyers serve as their own gatekeepers when
assessing potential conflicts.245  The inquiry into whether the
conflict might result in harm to a client rests entirely with the
“conflicted” attorney, and so will inevitably be subject to any
biases or blind spots the attorney may have.  Based on the
interviews and other accounts by lawyers who do capital mar-
kets work, it is difficult for an issuer’s counsel to perceive the
danger of prior interactions with underwriters that are appar-
ent from the quantitative data; moreover, even New York’s
stricter conflict of interest rules would permit representation
despite the pattern in outcomes, because they are not obvious
enough to preclude a “reasonable belief” that that diligent rep-
resentation can be given.  Greater awareness of the trends in-
herent in successive representation could make some
difference if it changes accepted beliefs about what types of
conflicts can be reasonably waived.  But it is not clear that this
would be the case.  And in a team-like deal, whether
groupthink, overlawyering, or unconscious bias is at work, it
would be hard for lawyers to reliably recognize the danger and
screen.
Second, the rationale for allowing clients to give “informed
consent” to concurrent representation—respect for client au-
tonomy246—makes far less sense if simple disclosure of a po-
tential conflict does not, and cannot, convey all the potential
ways in which loyalty can be undermined.  The information
upon which “informed consent” rests is the fact of concurrent
243 In interviews, most lawyers readily acknowledged that issuer’s counsel
frequently pandered to underwriters with whom they had worked; however, all
were firm that they had never fallen into the same trap.
244 See Leonard E. Gross, Are Differences Among the Attorney Conflict of Inter-
est Rules Consistent with Principles of Behavioral Economics?, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 111, 149 (2006).  Professor Gross’s study surveyed graduates of Southern
Illinois University Law School and found that 68% of respondents claimed to
inform their clients that conflicts were nonwaivable less than 10% of the time;
another 15% of respondents stated that they informed their clients that the con-
flicts were nonwaivable only 25% of the time. See id. at 149; see also Bryan K.
Church & Xi (Jason) Kuang, Conflicts of Interest, Disclosure, and (Costly) Sanc-
tions: Experimental Evidence, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 505, 526–27 (2009).
245 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7, cmt. 1.
246 The rationale for allowing informed consent typically rests on concerns for
client autonomy. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 122
cmt. g(iv) (AM. LAW INST. 2000) (“Concern for client autonomy generally warrants
respecting a client’s informed consent.”).
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representation, but analysis of the data raises doubts that
such information conveys everything that would be relevant for
consent.  For the previously discussed reasons, the team-like
dynamic of an IPO deal makes it seem as though prior or even
concurrent representation would not present a problem, and
may even be a benefit, because everyone has the same goals.
However, as discussed in the preceding sections, conflicts may
exist that are not obvious, and that in hindsight would appear
to be subject to truly informed consent.
2. Organizational Representation
This Article has thus far treated issuing companies as
though they are singular clients.  However, as in any organiza-
tion, the picture is more complex.  The ultimate client is the
organization itself, but the organization acts through its of-
ficers and directors, any of whom may have interests that di-
verge from what is ultimately best for the company.  The group
nature of capital markets deals further complicates this al-
ready muddy distinction, and may compromise counsel’s abil-
ity to serve their organizational clients.
The Model Rules make clear that when lawyers represent
an organization, their duty runs to the organization itself.247
This implies that good legal advice would include what is best
for the company, even if the company management cannot see
what that would be.  The ability to give such advice, however, is
undermined for all the reasons already stated.  For instance,
an issue like underpricing may not have a large impact on the
issuer’s management as individuals, because they will fre-
quently be prohibited from selling their shares until months
after the IPO and so will not be adversely affected.248  They
themselves may have also been “spun,” or sold shares in future
hot IPOs lead by the underwriter to soothe any lingering bad
feelings from an underpriced deal.249  However, underpricing is
still a long-term problem for a newly public company because it
has less cash to operate.  Acquiescing to underpricing can thus
be understood as an agency problem on multiple levels, mean-
ing that counsel cannot adequately represent the organiza-
tional client without advising management about where their
own interests may diverge from those of the company.
A fulsome analysis of this potential problem is beyond the
scope and space limitations of this Article, but it is an issue
247 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13.
248 See Griffith, supra note 17, at 609, 636–43. R
249 See id.
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that requires further exploration.  At a very general level, the
ethics rules should require disclosure of recent representa-
tions, as well as the associated unintended consequences.  A
solution might also entail barring acting as issuer’s counsel
following multiple deals with the same underwriter in a certain
period of time, akin to the rules mandating the rotation of
auditing partners that came into force in the wake of the corpo-
rate accounting scandals in the late 90s and early 2000s.250
Finally, the rules should require counsel to explain to the client
not only the fact of a prior representation but also the ways in
which the parties’ incentives diverge and the possible impact
that could have on the deal.  In any event, an explicit recogni-
tion of the problem is an important step in prompting the bar to
vigilance.
C. Managing Agency and Teamwork
In addition to the legal and ethical considerations dis-
cussed above, it is worth considering practical solutions to ad-
dress problems inherent in teamwork.  The first is that lawyers
should take a larger role in setting the norms of a deal team,
including a norm that provides space for dissent without dis-
rupting the team dynamic.251  The second, ironically, is that
lawyers should revise their view of their own role on a deal team
as more adversarial, or at least critical of the supposed market
standards that prevail.  The third is that lawyers should prime
more critical approaches by locating more information.252  I
discuss each of these in more detail here.
One means of managing the tension between agency and
teamwork is to develop a different understanding of the law-
yer’s role in the group process of bringing an IPO to market.
Social science research indicates that in a group setting indi-
viduals will silence themselves if they think that dissent from
the prevailing norm will lead to punishment or loss of reputa-
tion, both of which are dangers for lawyers working with famil-
iar underwriters.253  However, the research also reveals that
the most effective teams require more than just familiarity,
trust, and routinization; they also require a set of norms and
practices for raising problems and resolving disputes, while
250 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10A(j), 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2012).
251 See Hackman, supra note 22, at 246–55. R
252 See Turner & Pratkanis, supra note 82, at 105–08. R
253 See SUNSTEIN & HASTIE, supra note 83, at 107. R
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maintaining the trust and safety that familiarity affords.254  In-
deed, the research shows that teams in which group members
raise conflicts, dissent, or play devil’s advocate perform better
than teams in which conflict is downplayed.255  However, there
is a catch: the conflicts must be raised in a way that maintains
the collaborative ethos of the group, a task that requires good
communication skills and emotional intelligence.256  As both
advisors and process experts, lawyers are particularly well
positioned to suggest group norms that include and even re-
ward dissenting views, in the interest of improving the deal.
Making the expectation clear at the outset of the deal that the
lawyers will actively pursue dissenting viewpoints, while still
working with the team, would lessen the perceived cost of
breaking from the group’s consensus.257
Of course, to do so, issuer’s counsel would need to reframe
its role in the transaction as one consisting of more advocacy.
However, this need not be difficult.  Dissent is an advocacy-
type function that lawyers are ordinarily well trained to per-
form, and reframing counsel’s role would not be a major depar-
ture from what lawyers routinely do.  In order to advocate
effectively, a lawyer would need a more complex understanding
of his or her role in the interests of the various parties in the
deal, and the ways in which an issuer might be especially vul-
nerable.  This would mean developing a more nuanced under-
standing of when critical moments occur in the deal, as well as
what kind of advice to give.
Many of the most critical negotiations in an IPO are
thought to occur at the very end of the deal, when the issuer
and lead underwriter agree on an offering price just before the
stock goes public.  But the negotiations preceding pricing have
an impact on a number of factors that are influential in almost
any negotiation: the information available to the parties, the
nature of relationships between the parties (including patterns
of deference), and the alternatives available to the parties.  For
example, as previously discussed, certain types of disclosure
254 See Greer et al., supra note 84, at 116; see also Hackman, supra note 22, R
at 250, 261.
255 See Greer et al., supra note 84, at 116; see also Garry Emmons, Encourag- R
ing Dissent in Decision-Making, HARV. BUS. SCH. (Oct. 1, 2007), http://hbswk.hbs
.edu/item/encouraging-dissent-in-decision-making [http://perma.cc/KV94-
2PW5].
256 See Greer et al., supra note 84, at 116; see also Emmons, supra note 255. R
257 For example, in one large consulting firm where team tasks are empha-
sized, team members are charged with a “duty to dissent” to help avoid
groupthink.
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have a negative effect on initial offer price.258  Moreover, the
preliminary prospectus provides a basis for comparison be-
tween the issuer and other companies that have gone public,
which in turn provides an anchor for setting the initial offer
range and the final price.259  Instead of taking cues from the
underwriter, a more proactive issuer’s counsel could help to
establish a better bargaining position for the issuer from the
very beginning of the deal.
Providing effective advice would also involve developing
more information about market norms and performance, inde-
pendently of what is provided by underwriters and other par-
ties typically involved in such deals.  For example, gathering a
broader range of precedent documents or data about market
performance for issuing companies from the outset of a deal
could help to counter groupthink and the psychological weight
of anchoring.  If the lawyers have worked frequently with a
particular underwriter, it might be necessary to avoid using
precedent documents from previous deals with the under-
writer, or even change personnel from deal to deal.  While this
might diminish some efficiency gains, it would likely better
serve issuers in the long run.  Whether issuers take such ad-
vice or not, greater access to alternative views would help issu-
ers make better decisions regarding their deals, and lawyers
are uniquely placed to help provide this information.  Again,
these proposals require more in-depth analysis, but they pro-
vide a starting point for further thinking on the issue.
CONCLUSION
Working in teams—both on your own side of a deal and
with those nominally on the other side—is part of the reality of
transactional legal practice.  Familiarity and good teamwork
are beneficial, perhaps even essential, but they also carry more
costs for lawyers and their clients than many assume.  The goal
of this Article is to reveal those costs, explain the theory and
the evidence for their existence, and discuss how both law and
258 See Khaled Abdou & Mehmet F. Dicle, Do Risk Factors Matter in the IPO
Valuation?, 15 J. FIN. REG. & COMPLIANCE 63, 66–67 (2007).
259 The anchoring effect is a cognitive bias, described as the formation of a
belief about the value of something, based on a specified initial value, regardless
of whether that initial value is salient or entirely irrelevant. See JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 14 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos
Tversky eds., 1982) (“In many situations, people make estimates by starting from
an initial value that is adjusted to yield the final answer . . . .  [D]ifferent starting
points yield different estimates, which are biased toward the initial values.  We
call this phenomenon anchoring.”).
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deal practice should take them into account.  In doing so, this
Article does not suggest that teamwork is a bad thing or that it
should be dispensed with.  It merely suggests that familiarity,
trust, and the hallmarks of teamwork have especially compli-
cated implications for deal lawyers.  There are benefits, but also
costs that must be taken into account.  The point is that com-
panies make this cost-benefit analysis without awareness of
the cost of close relationships among the repeat players.  The
Article is an effort to bring those to light so that companies can
become aware of them, as can courts and practitioners.
The secondary goal of this Article is to dispel the myth in
legal practice, as has been done in other spheres, that good
relationships alone are enough for effective collaboration, and
that effective teamwork is something that arises through repe-
tition.  While those things are important elements to a good
working dynamic, it is essential for lawyers, even more than for
those in other professions, to develop the ability to recognize
conflict, dissent, and object, but do so in a way that preserves
the positive ethos of the working group.  This is not something
that develops automatically, but it is a skill to which lawyers
are well suited, and indeed they should employ if they wish to
balance the tension between agency and teamwork.  Though
teamwork is a popular topic, discussions of how to leverage it
properly and avoid its pitfalls are virtually absent from discus-
sions of good lawyering.  Nonetheless, if lawyers are to continue
to be effective transaction cost engineers in capital markets,
these conversations are important, and the skills that come
with them are essential, particularly at a time when the value
of legal education is in question and large corporate clients
complain that lawyers lack the ability to add value.
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APPENDIX
APPENDIX FIGURE 1.  VARIABLES ANALYZED AND STANDARD
CONTROLS USED FOR OLS AND PROBIT MODELS.
Outcome variables Main independent Additional control variables
tested (dependent variables: Types of
variables) lawyer interactions
tested
(IPOs together
within the preceding
1 year, 2 years, and
3 years)
• First trading day • Lead underwriter • Offering size (as the log of gross
price change and underwriter’s proceeds)
counsel
• Price change • IPO year and quarter fixed effects (a
relative to the S&P • Lead underwriter dummy variable for each year and
Index at 30 days, and the issuer’s quarter year in the sample)
60 days, 90 days, counsel (prior
and 1 year post interactions • IPO industry fixed effects (a dummy
offering across the table) variable for each industry in the
sample, using the SEC’s 3-digit SIC
• Probability of • Lead underwriter codes; Fama French industry
correct upward and the issuer’s classification codes used in alternative
price revision counsel as specifications)
underwriter’s
• Probability of counsel (potential • Underwriting bank fixed effects (a
securities class “conflict” deals: dummy variable for each lead
action litigation at prior interactions underwriting bank, de-weighted in the
6 months and 1 on the same side case of multiple lead underwriters)
year post offering of the table)
• Age of the issuer (as the log of the
• Prospectus size • Issuer’s counsel issuer’s age)
(as the log of and underwriter’s
prospectus size counsel (prior • Lead underwriter quality (according to
interactions number of IPOs performed –
• Proportion of across the table) robustness checks done using samples
prospectus of the seven most experienced banks
devoted to risk and the fourteen most experienced
factors banks)
• Proportion of • Lead underwriter quality (by IPO
prospectus market share for the preceding
devoted to MD&A calendar year)
• Length of time • Law firm experience/quality (as the
from the filing of number of IPO deals completed by
Form S-1 to the each law firm in the preceding 1-year,
offer date 2-year and 3-year periods)
• Volatility relative • Law firm experience/quality (by IPO
to the S&P Index market share for the preceding
at 30 days, 60 calendar year)
days, 90 days,
and 1 year post • Geographic location of law firms (by
offering ZIP code and city)
• Participation by venture capital
investors (a dummy variable indicating
the involvement of venture capital
investors prior to the IPO).
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APPENDIX FIGURE 2. SUMMARY STATISTICS.
Standard
N* Mean Median Min Max Deviation
Total IPO deals 2,265
Lead underwriters 268 1.40 1.00 1.00 7.00 0.82
Underwriter-underwriter’s counsel,
multiple deals in the past:
1 year Firm level 955 3.3 3.00 2.00 13.00 1.95
Lawyer level 412 2.60 2.00 2.00 9.00 1.14
2 years Firm level 1,135 3.89 3.00 2.00 16.00 2.63
3 years Firm level 1,231 4.24 3.00 2.00 19.00 3.07
Lawyer level 580 2.91 2.00 2.00 13.00 1.57
Underwriter-Issuer’s Counsel
multiple deals in the past:
1 year Firm level 450 3.04 2.00 2.00 13.00 1.87
Lawyer level 99 2.10 2.00 2.00 3.00 0.30
2 years Firm level 564 3.29 2.00 2.00 16.00 2.33
3 years Firm level 632 3.39 2.00 2.00 18.00 2.48
Lawyer level 161 2.17 2.00 2.00 5.00 0.45
Underwriter Counsel-Issuer
Counsel multiple deals in the past:
1 year Firm level 493 4.53 3.00 2.00 18.00 3.41
Lawyer level 20 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
2 years Firm level 582 5.51 3.00 2.00 27.00 4.90
3 years Firm level 639 6.18 4.00 2.00 31.00 6.17
Lawyer level 30 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Underwriter-Issuer’s Counsel multiple
“conflict” deals in the past 1 year:
Firm level 406 2.31 2.00 1.00 13.00 2.15
Lawyer level 111 2.47 2.00 1.00 11.00 2.16
IPO first day price increase
(percent) 2,265 0.28 0.11 -0.75 6.97 0.59
Company ages (years) 2,265 12.80 7.00 >1.00 157.00 18.21
Time to completion (days) 2,265 115.18 88.00 1.00 1016.00 93.83
* A number of deals involve more than one lead underwriter, which creates more
observations than deals.  Observations are de-weighted accordingly to account for this.
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APPENDIX TABLE 1.  OPENING DAY PERFORMANCE AND REPEATED
INTERACTIONS.
Dependent Variable: Opening Day Price Jump %
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A1: Lead Underwriter &
Underwriters’ Counsel – firm level
Deals together in 0.051*** 0.031*
past year (0.010) (0.012)
Deals together in 0.036*** 0.019*
past 2 years (0.007) (0.008)
Deals together in 0.029*** 0.015*
past 3 years (0.006) (0.007)
0.067*** 0.074*** 0.092*** 0.078*** 0.093*** 0.078***
Log Gross Proceeds (0.012) (0.017) (0.013) (0.018) (0.014) (0.018)
Adj. R2 0.210 0.268 0.197 0.266  0.195 0.261
Number of Observations 2,725 2,725 2,725 2,725 2,725 2,725
Panel A2: Lead Underwriter &
Underwriters’ Counsel – lawyer level
Deals together in 0.140*** 0.112***
past year (0.033) (0.034)
Deals together in 0.097** 0.077**
past 3 years (0.026) (0.021)
Log Gross 0.092*** 0.073*** 0.093*** 0.076***
Proceeds (0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.016)
Adj. R2 0.212 0.275  0.211 0.274
Number of Observations 2,725 2,725 2,725 2,725
Panel B1: Lead Underwriter
& Issuer’s Counsel
Deals together in 0.082*** 0.067**
past year (0.022) (0.024)
Deals together in 0.066*** 0.048**
past 2 years (0.016) (0.017)
Deals together in 0.056*** 0.037*
past 3 years (0.014) (0.015)
Log Gross 0.095*** 0.081*** 0.082*** 0.073*** 0.096*** 0.081***
Proceeds (0.014) (0.018) (0.014) (0.020) (0.016) (0.018)
Adj. R2 0.210 0.273 0.210 0.269 0.201 0.266
Number of Observations 2,725 2,725 2,725 2,725 2,725 2,725
Panel B2: Lead Underwriter &
Issuer’s Counsel – lawyer level
Deals together in 0.319*** 0.244*
past year (0.095) (0.095)
Deals together in 0.190** 0.128*
past 3 years (0.062) (0.063)
Log Gross 0.101*** 0.078*** 0.080*** 0.068***
Proceeds (0.014) (0.017) (0.013) (0.019)
Adj. R2 0.195 0.266 0.194 0.262
Number of Observations 2,725 2,725 2,725 2,725
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APPENDIX TABLE 1 (CONT’D).  OPENING DAY PERFORMANCE AND
REPEATED INTERACTIONS.
Dependent Variable: Opening Day Price Jump %
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel C1: Underwriters’
Counsel & Issuer’s Counsel
Deals together in 0.033*** 0.023*
past year (0.010) (0.010)
Deals together 0.021*** 0.014*
in past 2 years (0.006) (0.006)
Deals together 0.016*** 0.011*
in past 3 years (0.005) (0.005)
Log Gross 0.086*** 0.087** 0.087*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.088***
Proceeds (0.015) (0.023) (0.015) (0.023) (0.015) (0.023)
Adj. R2 0.189 0.252 0.187 0.251 0.188 0.251
Number of Observations 2,265 2,265 2,265 2,265 2,265 2,265
Panel C2: Underwriters’ Counsel  & Issuer’s
Counsel – lawyer level
Deals together in past 0.690* 0.692*
year (0.325) (0.348)
Deals together in 0.517** 0.475*
past 3 years (0.223) (0.240)
Log Gross 0.101*** 0.075*** 0.101*** 0.075***
Proceeds (0.014) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017)
Adj. R2 0.200 0.274 0.194 0.268
Number of Observations 2,725 2,725 2,725 2,725
Panel D1: Lead Underwriter & Issuer’s
Counsel – Past representation (firm level)
Past representation in 0.144*** 0.122**
the preceding year (0.037) (0.039)
Log Gross 0.096*** 0.075***
Proceeds (0.014) (0.017)
Adj. R2 0.194 0.266
Number of Observations 2,725 2,725
Panel D2:  Lead Underwriter & Issuer’s
Counsel – Past representation (lawyer level)
Deals together in 0.215** 0.161+
past year (0.087) (0.094)
Log Gross 0.101*** 0.076***
Proceeds (0.014) (0.017)
Adj. R2 0.191 0.263
Number of Observations 2,725 2,725
IPO Year Dummies X X X X X X
Industry* Year Dummies X X X X X X
Bank Dummies X X X
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates marked with +, *, **, and *** are statistically
significant at the10%,  5%, 1%, and 0.1% level respectively. The number of observations is greater
than the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each bank is treated as being a
manager in such cases, and the weight of each such observation is reduced.
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APPENDIX TABLE 3.  PROBIT ANALYSIS OF UPWARD REVISION FOR
STRONG PERFORMERS.
Dependent Variable: Upward Revision
(1) (2) (3) (4)
20% Bounce 30% Bounce
Panel A1: Lead Underwriter &
Underwriters’ Counsel – Firm level
Log Gross 0.582*** 0.597*** 0.486*** 0.485***
Proceeds (0.078) (0.084) (0.910) (0.100)
Marginal Effect 0.093** 0.087** 0.099* 0.101*
(frequent collaboration) (0.037) (0.037) (0.044) (0.044)
Number of Observations 964 906 698 625
Panel A2: Lead Underwriter & Underwriters’ Counsel
– lawyer level
Log Gross 0.604*** 0.597*** 0.547*** 0.577***
Proceeds (0.083) (0.084) (0.103) (0.108)
Marginal effect 0.045* 0.043* 0.047* 0.046*
(collaboration) (0.037) (0.018) (0.043) (0.020)
Number of Observations 964 906 659 612
Panel B1: Lead Underwriter &
Issuer’s Counsel – Firm level
Log Gross 0.594*** 0.610*** 0.501*** 0.501***
Proceeds (0.079) (0.084) (0.092) (0.100)
Marginal effect 0.008 0.005 -0.030 -0.274
(frequent) (0.049) (0.049) (0.524) (0.057)
Number of Observations 964 906 698 625
Panel B2: Lead Underwriter &
Issuer’s Counsel – lawyer level
Log Gross 0.620*** 0.597*** 0.547*** 0.577***
Proceeds (0.083) (0.084) (0.103) (0.108)
Marginal effect 0.008 0.024 0.010 0.019
(collaboration) (0.055) (0.056) (0.060) (0.060)
Number of Observations 964 906 659 612
Panel C1: Lead Underwriters’ Counsel &
Issuer’s Counsel – firm level
Log Gross 0.591*** 0.608*** 0.498*** 0.499***
Proceeds (0.079) (0.085) (0.092) (0.100)
Marginal effect 0.042 0.047 0.021 0.034
(frequent) (0.033) (0.034) (0.038) (0.041)
Number of Observations 964 906 698 625
Panel C2: Underwriters’ Counsel &
Issuer’s Counsel – lawyer level
Log Gross 0.619*** 0.643*** 0.547*** 0.596***
Proceeds (0.083) (0.088) (0.103) (0.109)
Marginal effect 0.059 0.066 0.024 0.042
(collaboration) (0.149) (0.145) (0.154) (0.152)
Number of Observations 964 906 659 612
Panel D1: Conflict Deals – Firm level
Frequent 0.100 0.080 -0.047 -0.026
Collaborator (0.109) (0.112) (0.122) (0.127)
Log Gross 0.591*** 0.607*** 0.500*** 0.500***
Proceeds (0.079) (0.084) (0.0922) (0.100)
Marginal effect 0.035 0.027 -0.016 -0.009
(frequent) (0.038) (0.038) (0.042) (0.045)
Number of Observations 964 906 698 625
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APPENDIX TABLE 3 (CONT’D).  PROBIT ANALYSIS OF UPWARD
REVISION FOR STRONG PERFORMERS.
Dependent Variable: Upward Revision
(1) (2) (3) (4)
20% Bounce 30% Bounce
Panel D2: Conflict Deals – lawyer level
Log Gross 0.617*** 0.644*** 0.568*** 0.601***
Proceeds (0.083) (0.089) (0.105) (0.110)
Marginal effect 0.025 0.009 -0.0002 -0.012
(collaboration) (0.060) (0.060) (0.065) (0.066)
Number of Observations 964 906 659 612
Industry Dummies X X X X
IPO Year Dummies X X X X
Industry*Year Dummies X X
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Estimates marked with +, *, **, and *** are statistically
significant at the 10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level respectively.  The number of observations is greater
than the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each bank is treated as being a
manager in such cases, and the weight of each such observation is reduced.
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APPENDIX TABLE 4.  PROBIT ANALYSIS OF PROBABILITY OF CLASS
ACTION LITIGATION.
Dependent Variable: Securities Class Action
Litigation Filed
Within 6 months of Within 1 year of offer
offer date date
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A1: Lead Underwriter &
Underwriters’ Counsel – firm level
Log Gross 0.237*** 0.291*** 0.254*** 0.300***
Proceeds (0.057) (0.081) (0.469) (0.030)
Marginal Effect -0.0007 0.0013 0.0002 0.0003
(of freq. collaboration) (0.002) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0029)
Number of Observations 2,639 1,645 2,705 2,138
Panel A2: Lead Underwriter &
Underwriters’ Counsel – lawyer level
Log Gross 0.225*** 0.269*** 0.307*** 0.343***
Proceeds (0.057) (0.080) (0.049) (0.060)
Marginal Effect 0.003 0.006 -0.0002  0.0015
(of freq. collaboration) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Number of Observations 2,639 1,645 2,705 2,138
Panel B1: Lead Underwriter
& Issuer’s Counsel – firm level
Deals Together in the 0.620 0.075 0.107*** 0.108***
preceding 1 year (0.065) (0.050) (0.032) (0.032)
Log Gross 0.235*** 0.291*** 0.251*** 0.290***
Proceeds (0.057) (0.082) (0.048) (0.058)
Marginal Effect 0.003 0.005 0.009*** 0.010***
(of freq. collaboration) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001)
Number of Observations 2,639 1,645 2,705 2,138
Panel B2: Lead Underwriter
& Issuer’s Counsel – lawyer level
Log Gross 0.225*** 0.269*** 0.305*** 0.343***
Proceeds (0.057) (0.080) (0.049) (0.060)
Marginal Effect 0.003 0.005 0.025  0.027
(of collaboration) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.017)
Number of Observations 2,639 1,645 2,705 2,138
Panel C1: Lead Underwriters’
Counsel & Issuer’s Counsel – firm level
Deals Together in -0.120* -0.113* 0.002 0.005
the preceding year (0.061) (0.057) (0.024) (0.024)
Log Gross 0.262*** 0.294*** 0.288*** 0.304***
Proceeds (0.073) (0.094) (0.057) (0.067)
Marginal Effect -0.005 -0.006* 0.0001 0.0005
(of collaboration) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Number of Observations 2,201 1,404 2,253 1,850
Panel C2: Underwriters’
Counsel & Issuer’s Counsel – lawyer level
Log Gross 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.024*** 0.027***
Proceeds (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007)
Marginal Effect -0.012 -0.003* 0.001 0.001
(of freq. collaboration) (0.014) (0.001) (0.009) (0.010)
Number of Observations 2,203 2,203 2,256 1,852
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APPENDIX TABLE 4 (CONT’D).  PROBIT ANALYSIS OF PROBABILITY OF
CLASS ACTION LITIGATION.
Dependent Variable: Securities Class Action
Litigation Filed
Within 6 months of Within 1 year of offer
offer date date
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel D1: Conflict Deals – firm level
Frequent 0.111 0.084 0.335*** 0.363***
Collaborator (0.156) (0.179) (0.109) (0.119)
Log Gross 0.231*** 0.289*** 0.238*** 0.278***
Proceeds (0.059) (0.082) (0.049) (0.060)
Marginal Effect 0.005 0.005 0.029*** 0.035***
(of freq. collaboration) (0.007) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013)
Number of Observations 2,639 1,645 2,705 2,138
Panel D2: Conflict Deals – lawyer level
Log Gross 0.231*** 0.270*** 0.393*** 0.0271***
Proceeds (0.059) (0.082) (0.050) (0.006)
Marginal Effect 0.020* 0.027*** 0.047***  0.044***
(frequent collaboration) (0.059) (0.014) (0.015) (0.019)
Number of Observations 2,639 1,645 2,705 1,847
Industry Dummies X X X X
IPO Year Dummies X X X X
Industry*Year Dummies X X
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Estimates marked with *, **, and *** are statistically
significant at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level respectively.  The number of observations is greater than
the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each bank is treated as being a manager in
such cases, and the weight of each such observation is reduced.
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APPENDIX TABLE 5.  TIME TO COMPLETION FROM S-1 FILING.
Dependent Variable: Length of Time from S-1 Filing to Offer
Date (in days)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A1: Lead Underwriter & Underwriters’
Counsel – firm level
Deals together in -2.523** -1.731**
the preceding 1 year (0.819) (0.546)
Deals Together in the -1.815** -0.955*
preceding 2 years (0.605) (0.441)
Deals Together in the -1.559** -0.760
preceding 3 years (0.530) (0.393)
Log -10.817*** -9.652*** -10.770*** -9.776*** -10.725*** -9.83***
(Gross Proceeds) (2.776) (1.600) (2.798) (1.601) (2.785) (1.599)
Adj. R2 0.188 0.145 0.188 0.144 0.188 0.144
Number of Observations 2,723 2,651 2,721 2,651 2,721 2,651
Panel A2: Lead Underwriter & Underwriters’
Counsel – lawyer level
Deals Together in -4.737*** -2.951**
the preceding 1 year (1.450) (1.125)
Deals Together in
the preceding 2 year
Deals Together in -3.962*** -2.174**
the preceding 3 year (1.012) (0.779)
Log -11.190*** -9.447*** -11.061*** -9.922***
(Gross Proceeds) (2.778) (1.596) (2.788) (1.598)
Adj. R2 0.187 0.144 0.188 0.145
Number of Observations 2,723 2,651 2,723 2,651
Panel B1: Lead Underwriter
& Issuer’s Counsel
Deals Together in -1.980 -0.718
the preceding 1 year (1.170) (0.820)
Deals Together in 0.238 -0.150
the preceding 2 year (1.100) (0.709)
Deals Together in 1.320 - 0.127
the preceding 3 year (1.570) (0.652)
Log -11.536*** -10.213*** -11.724*** -10.279*** -11.915*** -10.280***
(Gross Proceeds) (2.780) (1.594) (2.792) (1.594) (2.813) (1.596)
Adj. R2 0.187 0.143 0.187 0.143 0.187 0.143
Number of Observations 2,721 2,651 2,721 2,651 2,721 2,651
Panel B2: Lead Underwriter
& Issuer’s Counsel – lawyer level
Deals together in -9.816** -4.470
the preceding 1 year (4.278) (3.702)
Deals Together in -4.095 -0.002
the preceding 3 year (4.401) (3.019)
Log -11.544*** -10.238*** -11.600*** -10.282***
(Gross Proceeds) (2.777) (1.598) (2.779) (1.598)
Adj. R2 0.188 0.143 0.187 0.143
Number of Observations 2,723 2,651 2,723 2,651
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APPENDIX TABLE 5 (CONT’D). TIME TO COMPLETION FROM S-1 FILING
Dependent Variable: Length of Time from S-1 Filing to Offer
Date (in Days)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel C1: Underwriters’
Counsel & Issuer’s Counsel
Deals Together in -0.548 -0.011
the preceding 1 year (0.571) (0.500)
Deals Together in -0.435 -0.051
the preceding 2 year (0.422) (0.387)
Deals Together in -0.469 -0.118
the preceding 3 year (0.339) (0.307)
Log -12.448*** -10.610*** -12.454*** -10.604 -12.446 -10.592
(Gross Proceeds) (2.929) (1.687) (2.928) (1.688) (2.927) (1.686)
Adj. R2 0.163 0.140 0.163 0.139 0.163 0.140
Number of Observations 2,262 2,209 2,262 2,209 2,262 2,209
Panel C2: Underwriter Counsel & Issuer’s
Counsel – lawyer level
Deals Together in -8.713 -5.433
the preceding 1 year (7.492) (6.683)
Deals Together in -7.771 -1.866
the preceding 3 year (9.019) (8.222)
Log -11.646*** -10.278 -11.641*** -10.293***
(Gross Proceeds) (2.778) (1.600) (2.778) (1.600)
Adj. R2 0.187 0.143 0.187 0.143
Number of Observations 2,723 2,651 2,723 2,651
Panel D1: Conflict deals
Frequent -1.639 -2.873
Collaborator (4.625) (2.745)
Log -11.684*** -10.157***
(Gross Proceeds) (2.580) (1.598)
Adj. R2 0.186 0.144
Number of Observations 2,723 2,651
Panel D2: Conflict deals – lawyer level
Deals Together in the 6.00 -3.793
preceding 1 year (10.870) (4.358)
Deals Together in 4.535 -3.223
the preceding 3 year (8.409) (4.101)
Log -12.336*** -10.210*** -12.318*** -10.209***
(Gross Proceeds) (2.593) (1.606) (2.588) (1.609)
Adj. R2 0.186 0.143 0.186 0.143
Number of Observations 2,723 2,651 2,723 2,651
Industry Dummies X X X X X X
IPO Quarter Dummies X X X X X X
Industry Dummies* X X X X X X
IPO QuarterDummies
All deals X X X
Deal length < 365 days X X X
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates marked with *, **, and *** are statistically
significant at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level respectively. The number of observations is greater than
the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each bank is treated as being a manager in
such cases, and the weight of each such observation is reduced.
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APPENDIX TABLE 7.  ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS - OPENING DAY
PRICE INCREASE OUTCOME VARIABLE.
Dependent Variable: Opening Day Price Jump %
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Issuer’s
counsel
Underwriter’s recently
Underwriter- Underwriter- counsel and represented
Underwriter’s Issuer’s Issuer’s Underwriter
counsel: counsel: counsel: in IPOs: Deals
Deals in the Deals in the Deals in the in the last 1
last 1 year last 1 year last 1 year year
(1) Preferred Estimate – with stan- 0.049*** 0.089*** 0.021** 0.156***
dard controls (Standard errors) (0.011) (0.023) (0.007) (0.037)
Calibrating for quality of lead under-
writer – measured by number of
deals
(2) Limiting Sample to biggest lead 0.029* 0.077*** 0.029** 0.165***
underwriters: more than 40 IPO (0.013) (0.025) (0.012) (0.048)
deals
(3) Limiting Sample to biggest lead 0.041* 0.075*** 0.031 0.230***
underwriters: more than 80 IPO (0.018) (0.028) (0.017) (0.06)
deals
Calibrating for quality of lead under-
writer – measured dollar market-
share
(4) Controlling for lead underwriter 0.044*** 0.084*** 0.033*** 0.160***
dollar market share for IPOs in (0.011) (0.024) (0.010) (0.042)
preceding year
Calibrating for law firm experience –
measured by number of deals done
(5) Controlling for number of IPOs 0.048*** 0.085*** 0.027** 0.150***
done by law firm in the past 1 (0.011) (0.023) (0.011) (0.038)
year
(6) Controlling for number of IPOs 0.049*** 0.087*** 0.029*** 0.151***
done in the past 2 years (0.011) (0.023) (0.010) (0.039)
(7) Controlling for number of IPOs 0.049*** 0.087*** 0.029*** 0.151***
done in the past 3 years (0.012) (0.023) (0.010) (0.038)
(8) Excluding Wilson Sonsini (out- 0.049*** 0.082*** 0.035*** 0.100***
lier firm in number of deals; n (0.011) (0.030) (0.012) (0.038)
= 384)
Calibrating for lead underwriters’
use of “favorite” law firms
(9) Removing lead underwriters’ 0.072*** 0.095*** 0.031*** 0.173***
most frequently used law firm (0.019) (0.028) (0.011) (0.044)
in the dataset
(10) Removing anecdotally reported 0.053*** 0.090*** 0.033*** 0.146**
“favorite” law firm-bank rela- (0.012) (0.026) (0.009) (0.040)
tionships
Calibrating for availability of infor-
mation about the issuer / issuer risk
(11) Controlling for the age of the is- 0.049*** 0.088*** 0.031*** 0.160***
suer in number of years since (0.011) (0.023) (0.009) (0.039)
founding
(12) Controlling for the age of the is-  0.048*** 0.086*** 0.030*** 0.157***
suer in the log of the number of (0.011) (0.023) (0.009) (0.039)
years since founding
(13) Controlling for the presence of 0.047*** 0.086*** 0.030*** 0.151***
venture capital investors prior (0.011) (0.023) (0.009) (0.038)
to IPO
Altering year control categories
(14) IPO quarter instead of year 0.048*** 0.086*** 0.031*** 0.167***
(0.011) (0.023) (0.010) (0.040)
(15) Removing the year 1999 0.039*** 0.048*** 0.022*** 0.110***
(0.011) (0.014) (0.008) (0.030)
(16) Removing the year 2000 0.037*** 0.129*** 0.033*** 0.110***
(0.011) (0.039) (0.013) (0.038)
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APPENDIX TABLE 8.  ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS FOR CLASS
ACTION OUTCOME VARIABLE.
Dependent Variable: Probability of class action
litigation within 1 year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Issuer’s
counsel
Underwriter’s recently
Underwriter- Underwriter- counsel and represented
Underwriter’s Issuer’s Issuer’s Underwriter
counsel: counsel: counsel: in IPOs: Deals
Deals in the Deals in the Deals in the in the last 1
last 1 year last 1 year last 1 year year
(1) Preferred Estimate – with 0.0003 0.010*** 0.0005 0.035***
standard controls (Standard (0.0029) (0.001) (0.002) (0.013)
errors)
Calibrating for quality of lead
underwriter – measured by number of
deals
(2) Limiting Sample to biggest lead 0.002 0.014*** 0.001 0.046***
underwriters: more than 40 IPO (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.017)
deals
(3) Limiting Sample to biggest lead 0.005 0.016*** 0.007 0.047***
underwriters: more than 80 IPO (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.023)
deals
Calibrating for quality of lead
underwriter – measured dollar
marketshare
(4) Controlling for lead underwriter 0.001  0.013*** 0.0002 0.040***
dollar market share for IPOs in (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.015)
preceding year
Calibrating for law firm experience –
measured by number of deals done
(5) Controlling for number of IPOs -0.001 0.010*** -0.0006 0.034**
done by law firm in the past 1 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.014)
year
(6) Controlling for number of IPOs -0.002 0.010*** -0.001 0.034***
done in the past 2 years (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.012)
(7) Controlling for number of IPOs -0.002 0.010*** -0.001 0.034***
done in the past 3 years (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.015)
(8) Fixed effect for Wilson Sonsini -0.0001 0.011**  -0.0004 0.033***
(outlier firm in number of deals; (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.012)
n = 384)
Calibrating for lead underwriters’ use
of “favorite” law firms
(9) Removing lead underwriters’ 0.005 0.011** 0. 001 0.044***
most frequently used law firm in (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.015)
the dataset
(10) Removing anecdotally reported -0.001 0.010** 0.001 0.040***
“favorite” law firm-bank (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.015)
relationships
Calibrating for availability of
information about the issuer / issuer
risk
(11) Controlling for the age of the 0.001 0.010*** 0.0002 0.036***
issuer in number of years since (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.012)
founding
(12) Controlling for the age of the 0.001 0.010*** 0.0002 0.036***
issuer in the log of the number of (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.014)
years since founding
(13) Controlling for the presence of 0.0005 0.010*** 0.0006 0.036***
venture capital investors prior to (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.009)
IPO
Altering year controls
(14) IPO quarter instead of year -0.002 0.017*** 0.004 0.068***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.014)
(15) Removing the year 1999 0.001 0.015*** 0.003 0.046***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.013)
(16) Removing the year 2000 0.0003 0.006 -0.004 0.026**
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.012)
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APPENDIX TABLE 9.  LIMITING TO IPOS MANAGED BY LARGEST
BANKS – UNDERWRITER & UNDERWRITER’S COUNSEL.
Dependent Variable: Opening Day Price Jump %
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Deals together in past 0.029* 0.041*
year (0.013) (0.018)
Deals together in past 0.019* 0.026*
2 years (0.008) (0.011)
Deals together in past 0.013* 0.019*
3 years (0.0064) (0.008)
Log 0.049* 0.056** 0.0487* 0.055**  0.0485* 0.056**
(Gross Proceeds) (0.019) (0.0212) (0.0192) (0.0210) (0.0191) (0.0211)
Industry Dummies X X X X X X
IPO Year Dummies X X X X X X
Industry* Year Dummies X X X X X X
Bank Dummies X X X X X X
Manager>=40 X X X
Manager>=80 X X X
Adj. R2 0.328 0.325 0.328 0.322 0.326 0.321
Number of Observations 1,534 940 1,534 940 1,534 940
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Estimates marked with *, **, and *** are statistically
significant at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level respectively.  The number of observations is greater than
the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each bank is treated as being a manager in
such cases.
APPENDIX TABLE 10. NEGATIVE DISCLOSURE – UNDERWRITER &
UNDERWRITER’S COUNSEL
(1) (2) (3)
Deals together in 0.309***
past year (0.057)
Deals together in 0.200***
past 2 years (0.040)
Deals together in 0.150***
past 3 years (0.035)
Industry Dummies X X X
IPO Year Dummies X X X
Industry* Year Dummies X X X
Adj. R2 0.166 0.166 0.164
Number of Observations 2,247 2,247 2,247
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APPENDIX TABLE 11. NEGATIVE DISCLOSURE – UNDERWRITER’S
COUNSEL & ISSUER’S COUNSEL
Dependent Variable: Proportion of
Prospectus Devoted to Risk Factors
(1) (2) (3)
Deals together in 0.190***
past 1 year (0.043)
Deals together in 0.173***
past 2 years (0.031)
Deals together in 0.151***
past 3 years (0.024)
Industry Dummies X X X
IPO Year Dummies X X X
Industry* Year Dummies X X X
Adj. R2 0.163 0.168 0.171
Number of Observations 2,247 2,247 2,247
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates marked with *, **, and *** are statistically
significant at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level respectively. The number of observations is greater than
the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each bank is treated as being a manager in
such cases.
APPENDIX TABLE 12. NEGATIVE DISCLOSURE – UNDERWRITER &
ISSUER’S COUNSEL
Dependent Variable: Proportion of
Prospectus Devoted to Risk Factors
(1) (2) (3)
Deals together in 0.437***
past 1 year (0.077)
Deals together in 0.342***
past 2 years (0.062)
Deals together in 0.321***
past 3 years (0.054)
Industry Dummies X X X
IPO Year Dummies X X X
Industry* Year Dummies X X X
Adj. R2 0.165 0.166 0.167
Number of Observations 2,247 2,247 2,247
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates marked with *, **, and *** are statistically
significant at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level respectively. The number of observations is greater than
the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each bank is treated as being a manager in
such cases.
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APPENDIX TABLE 13. NEGATIVE DISCLOSURE – ISSUER’S COUNSEL
WITH RECENT EXPERIENCE AS UNDERWRITER’S COUNSEL
Dependent Variable: Proportion of Prospectus
Devoted to Risk Factors
Deals together in 1.281***
past 1 year (0.242)
Industry Dummies X
IPO Year Dummies X
Industry* Year Dummies X
Adj. R2 0.165
Number of Observations 2,247
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates marked with *,
**, and *** are statistically significant at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level
respectively. The number of observations is greater than the number of
IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each bank is treated as being
a manager in such cases.
